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REMIC TAX ENFORCEMENT AS FINANCIAL-MARKET REGULATOR
Bradley T. Borden & David J. Reiss*
ABSTRACT
Lawmakers, prosecutors, homeowners, policymakers, investors, news
media, scholars and other commentators have examined, litigated, and reported on
numerous aspects of the 2008 Financial Crisis and the role that residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) played in that crisis. Big banks create RMBS
by pooling mortgage notes into trusts and selling interests in those trusts as
RMBS. Absent from prior work related to RMBS securitization is the tax
treatment of RMBS mortgage-note pools and the critical role tax enforcement
should play in ensuring the integrity of mortgage-note securitization.
This Article is the first to examine federal tax aspects of RMBS mortgagenote pools formed in the years leading up to the Financial Crisis. Tax law
provides favorable tax treatment to real estate mortgage investment conduits
(REMICs), a type of RMBS pool. To qualify for the favorable REMIC tax
treatment, an RMBS pool must meet several requirements relating to the
ownership and quality of mortgage notes. The practices of loan originators and
RMBS organizers in the years leading up to the Financial Crisis jeopardize the tax
classification of a significant portion of the RMBS pools. Nonetheless, the IRS
appears to believe that there is no legal or policy basis for challenging REMIC
classification of even the worst RMBS pools. This Article takes issue with the
IRS’s inaction and presents both the legal and policy grounds for enforcing tax
law by challenging the REMIC classification of at least the worst types of RMBS
pools. The Article urges the IRS to take action, recognizing that its failure to
police these arrangements prior to the Financial Crisis is partly to blame for the
economic meltdown in 2008. The IRS’s continued failure to police RMBS
arrangements provides latitude to industry participants, which facilitates future
economic catastrophes. Even without the IRS taking action, private parties can
rely upon the blueprint set forth in the Article to bring qui tam or whistleblower
claims to accomplish the purposes of the REMIC rules and obtain the beneficial
results that would occur if the IRS enforced the REMIC rules.

*

Brad and David are Professors of Law at Brooklyn Law School. They thank Emily Berman,
Anita Bernstein, Dana Brakman Reiser, Neil Cohen, Steve Dean, Ted Janger, Steve Landsman,
and Alan Lederman for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. They also thank Orly
Graber and Tobias Schad for excellent research assistance. © 2013 Bradley T. Borden & David J.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

When real estate mortgage investment conduits (REMICs) operate in the
Congressionally-sanctioned manner, they drive capital to residential real estate
markets and help provide liquidity to all classes of homeowners. That capital
makes homeownership a reality for people who may not otherwise be able to
purchase a home and it also fuels economic growth. Unfortunately, in the years
leading up to the 2008 Financial Crisis, REMIC sponsors disregarded
Congressional mandates, labeling arrangements as “REMICs” even though they
did not qualify for that label. REMIC organizers (including loan originators,
underwriters, and sponsors) knowingly originated and pooled problematic
mortgage notes to form residential-mortgage backed securities (RMBS). RMBS
pools thus included mortgage notes signed by uninformed and unqualified
borrowers with insufficient collateral to ensure repayment of the notes. Having
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established these purported REMICs, the organizers then misrepresented their
quality to investors.
The practices of REMIC organizers were an integral part of financial
debacle that brought the multi-trillion dollar real estate finance industry to its
knees. In fact, the practices literally brought the U.S. Treasury to his knees as its
Secretary, Hank Paulson, pled with House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to keep her party
on board with the 2008 federal government bailout designed to address the
Financial Crisis.1 The practices also crippled the world economy. If the IRS had
enforced the REMIC rules, it would have deterred the unsavory practices of
REMIC organizers, which most likely would have help prevent or, at least,
reduced the magnitude of the Financial Crisis. Now the IRS must take action to
help clean up the mess and collect revenues to which the government is legally
entitled.
REMICs are the result of mortgage securitization—the process of pooling
illiquid assets, such as mortgage notes, into an RMBS pool (commonly a state-law
trust) and selling securities in the pool to investors. The securitization process
requires several steps. Loan originators, such as local banks, lend money in
exchange for mortgage notes and mortgages. Loan originators then sell the
mortgage notes and mortgages to an RMBS sponsor. The RMBS sponsor gathers
hundreds of mortgage notes and mortgages from loan originators and transfers
them to an RMBS trust in exchange for interests in the trust. The sponsor then
sells the RMBS to investors. If an RMBS trust satisfies several requirements, it
will be a REMIC and receive favorable tax treatment.2
Congress designed the REMIC requirements to ensure that only highquality mortgage notes enter RMBS pools that seek REMIC classification. By
failing to securitize only high-quality mortgage notes in REMICs, RMBS
sponsors violated tax law on a wide scale. The IRS would have uncovered such
violations if it had audited REMICs. Early detection of violations through tax
enforcement would have deterred much of the behavior that is responsible for the
Financial Crisis. The IRS’s failure to audit REMICs and enforce the REMIC rules
thus allowed practices to deteriorate and was one of the causes of the Financial
Crisis. Having missed that opportunity, the IRS should now take action by
challenging the classification of at least certain types of REMICs. Such actions
will add to government revenues, put mortgage securitizers on notice that they
must comply with Congress’ mandates, re-establish the IRS’s role as an impartial
enforcer of federal tax statutes, and guide the tax bar as it advises financial
institutions about the requirements for REMICs.
1

Liz Wolgemuth, Hank Paulson: Kneeling Before Pelosi, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 26,
2008), available at http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/the-inside-job/2008/09/26/hankpaulson-kneeling-before-pelosi.
2
See infra text accompanying notes 151-153.
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The significant amount of litigation that followed the RMBS collapse has
exposed a number of unsavory lending and securitization practices that led to the
Financial Crisis.3 In these legal battles, banks and RMBS sponsors have found
themselves in the crosshairs of not only RMBS investors and government
agencies but also homeowners. Homeowners and borrowers fight foreclosure and
bankruptcy claims in downstream litigation; RMBS investors and prosecutors sue
RMBS sponsors in upstream litigation.4 In downstream litigation, homeowners
challenge claims of parties who attempt to foreclose on property or bring a claim
in bankruptcy. The results of downstream RMBS litigation are mixed both from a
legal and contextual perspective. In some jurisdictions, courts rule in favor of
homeowners and estop purported mortgage holders from foreclosing on property
or participating in bankruptcy proceedings.5 In other jurisdictions, courts allow
purported mortgage holders to proceed with foreclosures or participate in
bankruptcy proceedings.6 States have also filed lawsuits against lenders and other
financial institutions in the mortgage industry claiming unfair and otherwise
inappropriate lending and foreclosure practices.7 The results of some of these
actions appear in headlines reporting settlements between states and financial
institutions that total many billions of dollars.8
In upstream RMBS litigation, RMBS investors sue for various types of
wrongdoing on the part of financial institutions. Investors claim that financial
institutions did not properly disclose their liability exposure, that mortgage
securitizations did not proceed as represented in offering materials and required
by pooling and servicing agreements (PSAs), and that RMBS sponsors
misrepresented facts about the ownership and quality of pooled mortgages.9 Much
3

See generally FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT
(2011). See also John M. Griffin & Gonzalo Maturana, Who Facilitated Misreporting in
Securitized Loans? (Working Paper, April 20, 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2256060 (examining prevalence of four misrepresentation indicators in
private-label RMBS).
4
REFinblog.com presents and summarizes both downstream and upstream litigation matters.
5
See id.
6
See id.
7
See, e.g., Complaint, New York v. J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, No. 451556/2012 (Sup. Ct. N. Y.
County Oct. 10, 2012) (filing by New York Attorney General against J.P. Morgan for fraudulent
and deceptive acts in promoting and selling MBS); Press Release, Lender Processing Services,
Inc., Lender Processing Services Announces Multi-State Attorneys General Settlement;
Significant Civil Litigation Also Resolved (Jan. 31, 2013), available at
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/lender-processing-services-announces-multi-140000279.html
(announcing LPS settlement over robo-signing allegations “with the attorneys general of 46 states
and the District of Columbia”).
8
See, e.g., Nelson D. Schwartz & Shaila Dewan, States Negotiate $26 Billion Agreement for
Homeowners, N.Y. TIMES Feb. 8, 2012, at A1.
9
See infra text accompanying notes 93-144.
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of the upstream litigation is in its early stages but involves astronomical sums of
money. Figure 1 summarizes the litigation landscape in this area.

The Financial Crisis has been written about from many angles, but this
Article is the first to approach it from the perspective of tax policy. It illustrates
that law and policy do not support REMIC classification of numerous RMBS
pools. The Article suggests that had the IRS enforced statutory requirements for
REMICs, it could have helped prevent the Financial Crisis. After analyzing
multiple questions of first impression that the courts will face in resolving RMBS
litigation, this Article concludes that even today the IRS could and should take
action against REMICs that flagrantly violate the REMIC rules.
Part II of the Article recounts the history of the RMBS industry and the
role of REMIC classification in that industry. The discussion reveals that
policymakers and commentators support mortgage-note securitization because it
provides greater liquidity to residential mortgage lenders, reduces the cost of
borrowing, and makes homeownership available to a broader cross-section of the
population. Congress enacted the REMIC rules to facilitate mortgage
securitization by providing tax-favored treatment to RMBS structures that
satisfied several requirements. That favorable treatment was tailored to RMBS
structures and securitization processes that were common at the time. Following
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the enactment of the REMIC rules, however, lending and securitization practices
began to change. Leading up to the Financial Crisis, those practices simply ceased
to satisfy the applicable requirements. The result was disastrous.
Part III provides the legal basis for challenging the REMIC classification
of many RMBS arrangements. A comparison of the rules of REMIC classification
to actual securitization practices in the years leading up to the Financial Crisis
reveals that many RMBS arrangements that held themselves out as REMICs
could not satisfy the REMIC requirements. This analysis therefore discredits
claims of commentators and government officials who argue that there are no
good legal or policy reasons for challenging the tax classification of purported
REMICs.10
Part IV presents the policy reasons for challenging REMIC classification.
Congress enacted the REMIC rules to apply to a very specific type of mortgagenote pool. The requirements are grounded in sound tax policy and the IRS should
be duty-bound to enforce the rules. Granting favorable tax treatment to RMBS
arrangements that fail to adhere to those rules undermines Congressional intent
and the sound policy that supports the rules. Failure to enforce the rules allows
parties to siphon significant tax revenue from government coffers. The failure to
audit purported REMICs also empowered REMIC organizers to engage in
practices that led to the Financial Crisis. Continued failure to act in this area will
provide continued opportunities for such practices. IRS inaction also justifies the
tax bar’s poor work in this area, making the call to action all the more urgent. The
IRS has an obligation to act to thwart the type of behavior that brought the
world’s economy to its knees. Part V concludes.
II.

OVERVIEW OF RMBS INDUSTRY AND ROLE OF REMICS

For generations, Americans who wanted to buy a home would typically
contact a local thrift institution such as a savings and loan, or bank, and speak to a
loan officer who would evaluate their applications. Reserve requirements and
balance sheet restrictions limited the amount of money institutions could lend
under these conditions.11 That system stifled growth by limiting the amount of
cash available to lend to potential homeowners.12 Limited amounts of cash drive
up interest rates, making homeownership available only to people with prime
10

See, e.g., Joshua Stein, Dirt Lawyers Versus Wall Street: A Different View, PROB. & PROP.
(2013 forthcoming), available at
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0BxUYhg0cYUOTdjdSMXd3OWoyNGc/edit; John W. Rogers III,
Tax Issues Involving Flawed Securitization, Slaes, Exchanges & Basis Committee Meeting,
American Bar Association Section of Taxation, Orlando, Florida (Jan. 26, 2013).
11
See JEROME F. FESTA, SECURITIZATIONS: LEGAL & REGULATORY ISSUES, Chapter 1 (2013).
12
See id.
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profiles.13 Thus, the traditional practice for financing home ownership needed
innovation to make homeownership possible for a larger segment of society. The
answer appeared to lie with Wall Street.
A.

Origins of the RMBS Market

Wall Street investors had historically viewed home loans as riskier
investments than other assets because mortgages are regulated by a patchwork of
local and state laws and are tied to local economies.14 A local recession or natural
disaster could increase defaults and decrease the value of a portfolio of
geographically concentrated mortgages. These conditions kept Wall Street
investors out of the residential mortgage market. To help create more liquidity for
lenders and homebuyers, the federal government began considering mortgage
securitization as a possible source of greater liquidity in the late 1960s.15
Securitizations are carefully structured to achieve precise tax, accounting, and
regulatory treatment to make them attractive to such investors. To help reduce
risks associated with local economies the pool of mortgages were drawn from
diverse locations.16 Interests in these pools of mortgages are residential mortgagebacked securities (RMBS).
The most important factor in the development of the RMBS market was
the creation of two government-sponsored enterprises (“GSEs”): Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac. While Fannie had created a secondary market for certain loans prior
to 1970, the RMBS market began in earnest with the passage of the Emergency
Home Finance Act of 1970 (EHFA), which allowed GSEs to purchase and
securitize conforming mortgages. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac set up
standardized procedures for the creation and management of RMBS pools, and
guaranteed the timely payment of principal and interest on the securities backed
by the loans in the pool.17 GSEs only securitized conforming loans, meaning they
had to meet strict standards related to the borrower’s credit worthiness and the
value of the collateral.18

13

See David J. Reiss, Subprime Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allow Predatory Lending
to Flourish in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985, 992-93 (2005).
14
A part of the discussion of the history of RMBS derives from Reiss, supra note 13.
15
Then Housing and Urban Development Secretary George Romney championed the mortgage
securitization movement. See John C. Weicher, Setting GSE Policy Through Charters, Laws, and
Regulation, in SERVING TWO MASTERS, YET OUT OF CONTROL: FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC
120, 132 (Peter J. Wallison ed., 2001).
16
See Reiss, supra note 13, at 1004.
17
See David Reiss, The Federal Government's Implied Guarantee of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac's Obligations: Uncle Sam Will Pick up the Tab, 42 GA. L. REV. 1019, 1073 (2008).
18
See id. at 1032.
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Securitizations in the 1970s involved direct pass-through securities for
which investors received a mortgage-note pool’s cash flow in proportion to their
ownership of securities in the pool.19 Thus, a person who owned five percent of
the pool’s securities would receive five percent of the cash flow from each
mortgage and be taxed accordingly. In the late 1970s, “the primary condition”
necessary for the explosion of RMBS securitization came about: “a funding
shortfall.”20 That is, the strong desire for home ownership and the rapid escalation
of housing prices created a demand for residential mortgages that the local
lending institutions could not meet. Wall Street firms responded.
Starting sporadically in the late 1970s, issuers not related to the federal
government such as commercial banks and mortgage companies began to issue
RMBS. These “private label” securities do not have the governmental or quasigovernmental guarantee that a federally related issuer, such as a GSE, would give,
and they are typically backed by nonconforming loans. Private-label securitization
gained momentum during the savings and loan crisis in the early 1980s. Wall
Street firms identified “a unique opportunity to profit from the thrift crisis by
proffering the securitization exit strategy as the solution to the thrifts’ residential
portfolio dilemma.”21 Issuers of these private-label securities were less regulated
and less consistent than Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac when it came to creating
and managing their products. Nonetheless, private-label RMBS faced a serious
impediment to their growth that arose from their tax treatment.
During the 1970s and early 1980s the tax classification and treatment of
the mortgage-note pools stymied the growth of the RMBS industry. RMBS
sponsors could structure the mortgage-note pools as investment trusts, which
required the mortgage-note pool to remain constant and the investors to have
proportionate interests in the mortgages that equaled their proportionate interests
in the trust.22 Consequently, the trust generally could issue only one class or type
of security.23 If the RMBS pool was an investment trust, the interest income from
the loans would flow through to the investors without the trust incurring any tax
liability.24 The proportionate ownership requirement, however, prohibited the
RMBS pool from issuing different classes (or tranches) of interests without

19

See JOHN FRANCIS HILSON & JEFFREY S. TURNER, ASSET-BASED LENDING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE
TO SECURED FINANCING, § 2:6.2 (2000).
20
See Leon T. Kendall, Securitization: A New Era in American Finance, in A PRIMER ON
SECURITIZATION , 1, 6 (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. Fishman eds., 1996).
21

Id.
See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(c)(1) (Nov. 3, 1967).
23
See id.
24
See I.R.C. §§ 671–679. Tax law treats investment trusts as grantor trusts. See Treas. Reg. §
1.671-2(e)(1), (3); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34347 (Sep. 14, 1970).
22
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becoming a taxable entity.25 Thus, RMBS sponsors had to choose between a
single tranche flow-through pool or a multiple-tranche taxable pool of mortgages.
Leaving the tax drawbacks aside, the financial benefits of multiple-tranche
mortgage-note pools are significant. A multiple-tranche mortgage-note pool
creates RMBS interests with different risk profiles. For instance, the mortgagenote pool over-collateralizes the highest rated tranche and pays the holders of that
tranche first. If the trust has sufficient proceeds, it can pay the holders of all of the
tranches. If borrowers begin to default, however, the trust may not be able to fully
pay the obligations of all the tranches. The lower-rated tranches thus have higher
risk and pay a higher rate of interest. The ability to provide tranches with different
risk profiles make RMBS attractive to a broader swathe of investors and add more
capital to the residential mortgage market. Most importantly, the least risky
tranches were rated investment-grade by the rating agencies, making them eligible
for purchase by a range of institutional investors.26
As noted, the problem with the multiple-tranche RMBS structure was that
it would not qualify for flow-through taxation.27 Consequently, a multiple-tranche
RMBS trust would be a tax corporation and have to pay tax on interest it earned
on loans;28 interests in such a trust might have been equity and not debt, so
payments to holders might not have been deductible;29 and RMBS holders would
have to pay tax on payments that they received.30 Thus, the tax aspects of multitranche RMBS structures made them unattractive to investors.
Congress was concerned about granting favorable tax treatment to
multiple-tranche RMBS structures because cash inflows and outflows and interest
income and deductions of such structures do not match.31 Because the risk profile
and date to maturity of the different tranches vary, the interest rate for the various
tranches varies, and the RMBS trust and the RMBS investors recognize interest
income at different times under the rules governing original issue discount.32 Even
if over time the income of RMBS holders and of the RMBS trust equalized, the
25

See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF
1986 (H.R. 3838, 99th Cong.; P.L. 99-514) [hereinafter 1986 Bluebook] at 407.
26
See generally STANDARD & POOR’S GUIDE TO CREDIT RATING ESSENTIALS (2011) available at
http://img.en25.com/Web/StandardandPoors/SP_CreditRatingsGuide.pdf.
27
See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 25, at 407; Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(c) (amended Dec. 17,
1996) (“An ‘investment’ trust will not be classified as a trust if there is a power under the trust
agreement to vary the investment of the certificate holders. . . . An investment trust with multiple
cases of ownership interests ordinarily will be classified as a [corporation].”).
28
See I.R.C. § 11(a) (imposing a tax on corporate income) (2012).
29
See I.R.C. § 163(a) (allowing a deduction for interest payment, but no similar deduction exists
for dividend payments).
30
See I.R.C. § 61(a)(7).
31
See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 25, at 412; Kirk Van Brunt, Tax Aspects of REMIC Residual
Interests, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 154–156 (1994) (describing the mismatch).
32
See Van Brunt, supra note 31, at 211–18.
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timing difference of that recognition could deprive the federal government of the
time-value-of-money related to the delayed tax payments on the interest income
of the junior tranche investors.33 Thus, Congress would only grant flow-through
treatment to multiple-tranche RMBS trusts if it could solve that problem.
Congress solved the problem with the REMIC rules by providing that
REMICs must have only regular interests and residual interests.34 The regular
interest holders must recognize interest income under the accrual method, taking
into account any original issue discount in their interests.35 The residual interest
holders, on the other hand, must recognize an amount of income (or loss) that is
necessary to account for income not recognized by the regular interest holders
(known as phantom income (or loss)).36 The holders of residual interests generally
recognize phantom income early in the life of the RMBS trust and phantom loss
in the later years.37 Even if the income and loss should offset each other, the
timing difference gives residual interests negative value.38 To account for that
income, an RMBS trust has to compute and estimate the performance of the loans
on the formation of the RMBS trust, and the trust assets have to remain static
throughout the life of the trust to give such computations and estimations
meaning.39 Figure 2 illustrates why the interest of the RMBS trust does not match
interest income of the RMBS investors.
33

See id. at 154–156, 184–185 (describing the timing difference).
See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 25, at 412 (“Holders of ‘regular interests’ generally take into
income that portion of the income of the REMIC that would be recognized by an accrual method
holder of a debt instrument that had the same terms as the particular regular interest; holders of
‘residual interests’ take into account all of the net income of the REMIC that is not take into
account by the holders of the regular interests.”); Bruce Kayle, Where Has All the Income Gone?
The Mysterious Relocation of Interest and Principal in Coupon Stripping and Related
Transactions, 7 VA. TAX. REV. 303, 348 (1987) (“Holders of residual interests take into account
the difference between the income generated by the REMIC’s assets and the amount of income
taken into account by the holders of the regular interests . . . .”).
35
See I.R.C § 860B(b) (requiring the use of the accrual method); § 1272(a)(6) (applying special
accrual rules to regular interest investors).
36
See I.R.C. §§ 860C(a), 860E(a) (requiring that the residual interest holder’s income be no less
than the excess inclusion (“phantom income”) for the year).
37
See supra text accompanying note 37.
38
See Van Brunt, supra note 31, at 203.
39
See I.R.C. § 1272(a)(6)(A) (providing that the daily accruals would derive in part from the
present value of remaining payments under a debt instrument—either the RMBS or the mortgage
note); Treas. Reg. § 1.860D-1(d)(2)(ii), (iii) (requiring a REMIC to report the following on the tax
return for its first taxable year: information about the terms and conditions of the regular and
residual interests and a description about the prepayment and reinvestment assumptions that the
REMIC uses for purposes of I.R.C. § 1272); See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 25, at 426 (“Congress
intended that such prepayment assumption will be determined by the assumed rate of prepayments
on qualified mortgages held by the REMIC and also the assumed rate of earnings on the
temporary investment of payments on such mortgages insofar as such rate of earnings would affect
the timing of payments on regular interests. The Congress intended that the Treasure regulations
34
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As part of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, Congress provided that RMBS trusts
that account for phantom income and loss are not subject to corporate taxation,
but qualify for flow-through taxation.40 The static-asset requirement goes beyond
merely limiting the transfer of mortgage notes into and out of the RMBS trust. It
also supports a fairly accurate assessment of the value of the mortgage notes in
the pool and the likelihood that the borrowers will make timely payments on the
loans. Factors such as the creditworthiness of the borrower, the value of the
collateral, the occupancy status of the collateral, and the trust’s right and ability to
foreclose on the collateral affect the value of the mortgage notes and the
likelihood and timeliness of payments.41 Consequently, Congress imposed strict
requirements related to the trust assets that multi-tranche RMBS trusts must
satisfy to qualify for REMIC flow-through treatment.42 RMBS trusts that fail to
will require these pricing assumptions to be specified in the first partnership return filed by the
REMIC.”).
40
See I.R.C. § 860A.
41
See, e.g., Griffin & Maturana, supra note 3 (identifying negative impact on payments of
unreported second liens, inflated appraisals, misrepresentation of owner occupancy and flipping);
State-Level Guarantee Fee Pricing: Notice, 77 Fed. Reg. 58991, 58991 (Sept. 25, 2012) (noting
“the exceptionally high costs” incurred “in cases of mortgage default in” certain states).
42
See I.R.C. §§ 860D, 860G; infra Part III.
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satisfy these requirements cannot accurately compute the income of the RMBS
holders and can siphon revenues from government coffers, if they use REMIC
flow-through taxation.43 Consequently, any RMBS trust that neither meets the
REMIC requirements nor is an investment trust must be taxed as a corporation.44
Following the Tax Reform Act of 1986, multiple-tranche mortgage-note
pools could elect the favored tax status of a REMIC if they satisfied the REMIC
requirements. At the time Congress created the REMIC rules, RMBS sponsors
appeared to take appropriate measures to ensure that they satisfied the REMIC
requirements. REMIC status revolutionized the RMBS industry. Between 1986
and 2008, REMICs became a significant part of the RMBS market. As of the end
of 2011, purported REMICs held more than $3 trillion of assets.45 That value was
about a quarter of all U.S. residential mortgages and a third of all securitized
mortgages.46
A simplified version of the securitization process in 1986 illustrates how
mortgage notes and mortgages moved to REMICs at the time Congress created
the REMIC rules. First, an originator lent money to a borrower. The borrower
signed a mortgage note for the amount of the loan and a mortgage granting the
lender a security interest in the loan. As part of the first step, the lender recorded
the mortgage with the county clerk.47 Second, the originator entered into a PSA
with a sponsor and trustee. Pursuant to the agreement, the originator sold the
mortgage note and mortgage to a REMIC sponsor for cash.48 If the mortgage note
was a bearer instrument, the originator transferred it by transferring possession of
the mortgage note, otherwise the originator indorsed the note and transferred
possession of it.49 As part of the second step, the REMIC sponsor recorded the
43

For example, miscalculations may result in understated phantom income of the holders of
residual interests. This could occur if the fair market value of the mortgage notes in the pool is less
than the value that the RMBS organizers claim it is. The overstated value would result in the trust
reporting less gross income than otherwise required under the rules governing original issue
discount. That underreporting would understate the amount of phantom income that the residualinterest holders would report in the early years of the RMBS.
44
See I.R.C. § 7701(i) (treating taxable mortgage pools as tax corporations); 1986 Bluebook, supra
note 25, at 411 (“The Congress believed that this vehicle should be the exclusive vehicle
(accompanied by exclusive tax consequences) relating to the issuance of multiple class mortgageback securities, and that the availability of other vehicles should be limited to the extent
possible.”).
45
See Amended Complaint, Knights of Columbus v. The Bank of New York Mellon, No.
651442/2011, at 36 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Aug. 16, 2011) (citing an April 27, 2011 Reuters
report).
46
See Federal Housing Finance Agency, Enterprise Share of Residential Mortgage Debt
Outstanding, 1990-2010, available at http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=70 (Microsoft Excel
spreadsheet).
47
See generally 4 MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 37.28 (2013).
48
See Reiss, supra note 13, at 1003 (describing securitization process).
49
See WOLF, supra note 47, § 37.27.
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transfer of the mortgage note and mortgage.50 Third, after the REMIC sponsor
acquired a pool of mortgage notes and mortgages, it transferred them to a REMIC
trust in exchange for the beneficial interests in the trust.51 The REMIC trust had
no managers, so its trustee recorded the transfer of the mortgage note and
mortgages with the county clerk.52 Fourth, the sponsor sold the beneficial interests
in the REMIC trust to investors.53 Figure 3 illustrates the traditional RMBS
securitization process from its inception in the 1970s until the 1990s.

B.

Mortgage Securitization with MERS

The process of assigning mortgages had been universally cumbersome
until the end of the 20th Century. Each assignment from originator to sponsor or
from sponsor to mortgage-note pool would be recorded in the local land records
where the property securing the mortgage loan was located. In the 1990s, industry
players, including Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the Mortgage Bankers
Association, sought to streamline the process of assigning mortgages from the
50

See id.
See FESTA, supra note 11, § 4.02.
52
See JASON H.P. KRAVITT, SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS § 9.02 (2012).
53
See FESTA, supra note 11, § 4.02.
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originator to the mortgage-note pool.54 They thought they had accomplished this
purpose by forming The Mortgage Electronic Recording System (MERS), which
was up and running by the late 1990s.55 The stated purpose of MERS is to reduce
the cost and administrative inconvenience of recording mortgage assignments.56
Members of MERS attempt to accomplish this purpose by naming MERS as
nominee of the originator, then trading and recording assignments internally
without the need of recording each assignment in the local land records.57 A
MERS mortgage contains a statement that says, in substance, that “MERS is a
separate corporation that is acting solely as nominee for the Lender and Lender’s
successors and assigns. MERS is the mortgagee under this Security Instrument.”58
MERS is not named on any note endorsement. This new system was designed to
save lenders a small but not insignificant amount of money in the form of
recording fees every time a mortgage was transferred. Unfortunately the legal
status of this private MERS tracking system was not clear and had not been
ratified by Congress or state legislatures, save for a few, and the concept did not
receive proper vetting from all affected constituents.59 Nonetheless, nearly all the
major mortgage originators and RMBS sponsors participated in MERS, and
MERS registered millions of mortgages within a couple of years of its inception.
As of 2012, MERS stated that more “than 74 million mortgages have been
recorded in the name of MERS Inc., of which 27 million are currently active.”60
A MERS-facilitated securitization originally occurred as follows: First, a
person would borrow from a loan originator, execute a note to the originator, and
grant the originator a mortgage in the property securing the loan. Second, the
originator would record the mortgage in the local recording office, naming MERS
as nominee. Third, the originator would assign its rights in the mortgage note and
mortgage and transfer them to an RMBS sponsor, and MERS would record the
assignment. Fourth, the sponsor would assign the mortgage note and mortgage
and transfer them to the RMBS trustee, and MERS would record the assignment.
Fifth, MERS would update its database to reflect the transfer of the mortgage to
54

Patrick C. Sargent & Mark W. Harris, The Myths and Merits of MERS (Sept. 25, 2012),
available at http://www.andrewskurth.com/pressroom-publications-926.html#FN1 (last visited
August 1, 2013) (MERS-sanctioned account).
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
See id.
58
See, e.g., Freddie Mac, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Authorized Changes for
MERS 1 (2012), available at www.freddiemac.com/uniform/doc/unifmersauth.doc (last visited
August 1, 2013).
59
For example, Minnesota enacted a “MERS Statute” that allowed nominees like MERS to record
an “assignment, satisfaction, release, or power of attorney to foreclose.” Minn. Stat. §507.413
(2013).
60
Sargent & Harris, supra note 54.
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the sponsor and RMBS trustee. Figure 4 illustrates the MERS-facilitated
securitization process as originally conceived and executed. The industry used
this process from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s.61

During this period of time, RMBS sponsors became more sophisticated
and the types of loans that lenders made proliferated, so RMBS sponsors
expanded the types of RMBS that they offered. Such specialized mortgage-note
pools included adjusted-rate-mortgage (ARM) loans with teaser rates, cash-out
home equity loans, and various subprime products.62 One type of RMBS pool that
emerged, and that is of particular interest here, was a second-lien RMBS. A
second-lien RMBS trust typically held second-lien mortgage loans. In the case of
default foreclosure, second-lien holders receive payment on their loans only after
the first-lien is satisfied.63 These new products appeared to accelerate the demand
for RMBS. As that demand increased in the early 2000s, loan originators and
61

See MERSCorp., MERS Today 2 (2012), http://www.mersinc.org/media-room/press-kit (last
visited August 1, 2013).
62
See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 102.
63
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, What Is a Second Mortgage Loan or Junior Lien?,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/105/what-is-a-second-mortgage-loan-or-juniorlien.html (June 12, 2013) (last visited August 1, 2013).
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RMBS sponsors began cutting corners at every level of the securitization process
in order to meet investor demand. Those actions flooded RMBS trusts with
mortgage notes that would not allow the trusts to properly account for interest
income inflow-outflow mismatch. Therefore, this jeopardized the REMIC
classification of an untold, but significant, percentage of all RMBS trusts.
Litigation decisions and documents detail the lax practices. Somewhat
counter-intuitively, downstream litigation (litigation between borrowers and
banks) is a primary source of information related to lax securitization practices.
Upstream litigation (litigation between RMBS investors and banks) is a primary
source of information relating to unsavory lending and loan-origination practices.
The discussion of claims in this Article assumes that the plaintiffs can support
their claims in many of the cases now being litigated. Given that these claims are
very consistent with the findings of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, the
analysis relies on the particulars in some of the cases to paint a picture of what a
typical REMIC might look like.64 Perhaps some RMBS trusts were not as bad as
the Article describes, but bad actions appear to have been rampant and the portrait
painted below very likely describes many RMBS trusts. The discussion also relies
upon just a handful of filed complaints, but they are consistent with dozens of
other cases.65 Other studies and reports provide a similar picture of the state of
affairs in the RMBS and mortgage lending industry leading up to the Financial
Crisis.66
C.

Deterioration of the Securitization Process (Downstream Litigation)

Corner-cutting in the lending and securitization process led to the
Financial Crisis. In re Kemp, a frequently cited decision from the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court displays the failed securitization practices that preceded the Financial
Crisis.67 On May 31, 2006, Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (Countrywide) lent
$167,000 to John Kemp,68 and Mr. Kemp signed a note naming Countrywide as

64

See generally FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, supra note 3.
See, e.g., Fed. Housing Fin. Agency v. UBS Americas, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 5201, at 2 n. 1
(S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2012), available at http://www.buckleysandler.com/uploads/104/doc/opinionorder-fhfa-v-ubs-americas-sdny-4-may-12.pdf (citing fifteen cases brought by the Federal Housing
Finance Agency against numerous defendants with similar allegations); REFinblog.com
(analyzing hundreds of downstream and upstream cases).
66
See, e.g., John M. Griffin, and Gonzalo Maturana, Who Facilitated Misreporting in Securitized
Loans? (Working Paper, April 30, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract+2256060 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2256060; FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT (2011).
67
In re Kemp, 440 B.R. 624 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010).
68
See id.at 627.
65
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the lender; no endorsement by Countrywide appeared on the note.69 An unsigned
allonge of the same date accompanied the note and directed Mr. Kemp to “Pay to
the Order of Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., d/b/a America’s Wholesale
Lender.”70 On the same day, Mr. Kemp signed a mortgage in the amount of
$167,000, which listed the lender as America’s Wholesale Lender, named MERS
as the mortgagee, and authorized it to act solely as nominee for the lender and the
lender’s successors and assigns.71 The mortgage referenced the note Mr. Kemp
signed and was recorded in the local county clerk’s office on July 13, 2006 (a
month and a half after Mr. Kemp signed it).72
On June 28, 2006, Countrywide, as seller, entered into a PSA with
CWABS, Inc., as depositor (i.e., sponsor); Countrywide Home Loans Servicing
LP as master servicer; and Bank of New York (BNY) as trustee.73 The PSA
provided that Countrywide sold, transferred, or assigned to the depositor “all the
right, title and interest of [Countrywide] in and to the Initial Mortgage Loans,
including all interest and principal received and receivable by [Countrywide].”74
The PSA provided that CWABS would then transfer the Initial Mortgage Loans,
which included Mr. Kemp’s loan, to the trustee in exchange for certificates
referred to as Asset-backed Certificates, Series 2006-8 (the RMBS).75
Presumably, the depositor then sold the RMBS to investors.
The PSA also provided that Countrywide, as depositor, would deliver “the
original Mortgage Note, endorsed by manual or facsimile signature in blank in the
following form: ‘Pay to the order of ________ without recourse’, with all
intervening endorsements from the originator to the Person endorsing the
Mortgage Note.”76 Although Mr. Kemp’s note was supposedly subject to the
PSA, Countrywide never endorsed it in blank or delivered it to the depositor or
trustee as required by the PSA.77 On the date of the purported transfer, no one
recorded a transfer of the note or the mortgage with the county clerk.78 The PSA
purported to assign Mr. Kemp’s mortgage “[t]ogether with the Bond, Note or
other obligation described in the Mortgage, and the money due and to become due

69

See id.
See id. An allonge is “[a] slip of paper sometimes attached to a negotiable instrument for the
purpose of receiving further indorsements when the original paper is filled with indorsements.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 83 (8th ed.2004).
71
See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 627.
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See id.
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See id. Park Monaco, Inc., and Park Sienna, LLC, also entered into the PSA as sellers. See id.
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See id.
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See id.
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See id.
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See id.
78
See id. at 627–28.
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thereon, with interest.”79 That assignment was recorded on March 24, 2008
(almost two years after the purported assignment of the mortgage).80
On March 14, 2007, MERS assigned Mr. Kemp’s mortgage to BNY as
trustee for the Certificate Holders CWABS, Inc. Asset-backed Certificates, Series
2006-8.81 On May 9, 2008, Mr. Kemp filed voluntary bankruptcy.82 On June 11,
2008, Countrywide, as servicer for BNY, filed a secured proof of claim noting
Mr. Kemp’s property as collateral for the claim.83 In response, Mr. Kemp filed an
adversary complaint on October 16, 2008, against Countrywide, seeking to
expunge its proof of claim.84 On September 9, 2009, Countrywide claimed to
have possession of the mortgage note.85
At trial in late 2009, Countrywide produced a new undated Allonge to
Promissory Note, which directed Mr. Kemp to “Pay to the Order of Bank of New
York, as Trustee for the Certificate-holders CWABS, Inc., Asset-backed
Certificates, Series 6006-8.”86 A supervisor and operational team leader for the
apparent successor entity of Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP (the master
servicer in the PSA) testified that the new allonge was prepared in anticipation of
the litigation and was signed weeks before the trial.87 That same person testified
that Mr. Kemp’s original note never left the possession of Countrywide, but
instead, it went to its foreclosure unit.88 She also testified that the new allonge had
not been attached to Mr. Kemp’s note and that customarily, Countrywide
maintained possession of the notes and related loan documents.89
In a later submission, Countrywide represented that it had the original note
with the new allonge attached, but it provided no additional information regarding
the chain of title of the note.90 It also produced a Lost Note Certificate dated
February 1, 2007, providing that Mr. Kemp’s original note had been “misplaced,
lost or destroyed, and after a thorough and diligent search, no one has been able to
locate the original Note.”91 The court therefore concluded that at the time of the
79
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filing of the proof of claim, Mr. Kemp’s mortgage had been assigned to BNY, but
Countrywide had not transferred possession of the associated note to BNY.92
Figure 5 summarizes the relevant Kemp facts, illustrating the failure to timely
transfer and record purported assignments of mortgage notes and mortgages.

The same types of problems arise in upstream litigation because the failure
to transfer mortgage notes and mortgages to the trusts negatively affects the value
of RMBS, violates representations in RMBS offering materials, and disregards
provisions of PSAs.93 Studies presented in upstream litigation materials illustrate
how rampant cases like Kemp had become. A study of almost a thousand
mortgages that were supposed to be held by three RMBS trusts formed in 2005,
2006, and 2007, respectively, found that none of the mortgages had been assigned
to the trusts on the date the RMBS sponsor issued the RMBS.94 Within three
months after the issuances of the RMBS, less than 1% of the mortgages had been
assigned to the trusts, and more than half of the mortgages were never assigned to
92

See id.at 629.
See, e.g., Consolidated Complaint, HSH Nordbank AG v. Barclays Bank PLC, No.
652678/2011, at 13–14, 19–20 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Apr. 2, 2012); Knights of Columbus
Amended Complaint, supra note 45, at 11 –17.
94
See Nordbank Consolidated Complaint, supra note 93, at 15–16.
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the trusts.95 The study also found that the parties routinely failed to transfer the
mortgage notes to the RMBS trusts. A sample of 442 mortgage notes found that
only 7, or 1.6% of the total notes were transferred to the trusts within three
months after the issuance of the RMBS.96 Investigations also revealed that of the
mortgages that the parties did eventually assign to the RMBS trusts, several were
assigned to the wrong trust.97 Other RMBS trustees apparently disregarded and
failed to disclose audit information that confirmed that the RMBS trust did not
have possession of the notes.98
Despite representations in the offering materials and provisions in the
PSAs to the contrary, many RMBS trusts did not hold mortgage notes and
mortgages they purported to hold on the issuance date. Even though they
eventually acquired a small percentage of the mortgage notes and mortgages,
those acquisitions occurred several months after the formation of the RMBS
trusts. The RMBS sponsors were responsible to transfer the mortgage notes and
mortgages,99 but they knew that the RMBS trusts did not have the mortgage notes
or mortgages at the time the RMBS trust was formed. The robo-signing scandal
that occurred in the wake of the Financial Crisis was rooted in part in an effort to
remedy the problems that arise when notes are not properly transferred.100 This
scandal is further evidence that the securitization process in the years preceding
the Financial Crisis failed terribly. Figure 6 depicts the securitization process
described in Kemp that was prevalent in the years leading up to the Financial
Crisis.
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See id. at 16.
See id. at 18.
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See id. at 17.
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100
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Near 'Robo-Signing' Settlement, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2012, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203735304577169014293051278.html.
96

REMIC TAX ENFORCEMENT AS FINANCIAL-MARKET REGULATOR

21

The discussion below illustrates that failure of the securitization process
jeopardizes the REMIC status of numerous RMBS trusts.101
D.

Deterioration of Lending Underwriting Practices (Upstream Litigation)

The discussion of the securitization process reveals that RMBS sponsors
did not transfer mortgage notes and mortgages to the RMBS trusts. Even if they
had transferred the mortgage notes and mortgages, the quality of the loans
represented by the notes and mortgages was so poor, they would not satisfy
REMIC requirements. The following discussion illustrates that RMBS sponsors
failed to adequately perform due diligence and act on information from the due
diligence they did perform, and lenders abandoned responsible mortgage
underwriting practices. As a result of the failed due diligence and underwriting
functions, loans made to unqualified borrowers for homes with undesirable
occupancy rates entered into RMBS trusts. Poor appraisal practices also left loans
undercollateralized. As a result of these problems, many loans were delinquent (or
delinquency was imminent) when they entered the RMBS trusts.

101

See infra Part III. A.
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Failure of Mortgage Underwriting and Due Diligence

A critical part of the RMBS securitization process is the mortgage
underwriting function. Loan originators underwrite loans they make.
Underwriting in this context is the process of assessing the potential risk and
profitability of making a loan to a particular borrower.102 Traditional home
mortgage underwriting included three elements: (1) collateral, (2) borrower
creditworthiness (i.e., willingness to pay), and (3) the borrowers capacity to pay
(e.g., income).103 Originators abandoned those traditional underwriting guidelines,
and, often with the knowledge of RMBS sponsors, transferred low-quality
mortgages notes and mortgages to RMBS trusts. Originators found that the more
risky loan products were the most profitable, so they pressed sales agents to push
the risky products, such as option ARM, home equity, and subprime loans, and
they structured sales-agent compensation to encourage such efforts.104
As a result of the failed underwriting function, the lending practices in the
mid-2000s became abysmal. Originators failed to verify borrowers’ employment
or income, made loans to borrowers who they knew could not repay the loans or
even make required payments, and reduced the time that had to pass since a
borrower’s prior bankruptcy.105 Originators would also fake proof of loan
applicants’ employment and rent-paying history.106 One originator developed a
process called the High Speed Swim Lane (HSSL or Hustle) model for loan
origination, complete with the motto, “Loans Forward, Never Backward.”107 As
part of Hustle, the origination eliminated toll gates that slowed the originator
process, including processes necessary for originating investment-quality loans
102

See WILLIAM B. BRUEGGEMAN & JEFFREY D. FISHER, REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND
INVESTMENTS 213 (13th ed. 2008); DAVID C. LING & WAYNE R. ARCHER, REAL ESTATE
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1422, at 16 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2012), available at
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nt.pdf.

REMIC TAX ENFORCEMENT AS FINANCIAL-MARKET REGULATOR

23

and for preventing fraud.108 Hustle even eliminated the underwriting function
from all but the riskiest loans.109 Originators also steered borrowers to high risk
products and granted loans without establishing credit scores.110 With this
process, they would make loans to just about anybody who applied for one, even
though the borrowers clearly did not qualify.111 RMBS sponsors were aware that
originators had abandoned their underwriting guidelines.112
RMBS sponsors also relaxed their due diligence practices well below the
standards they represented in offering materials. For example, sponsors instructed
due diligence vendors not to verify occupancy status or credit scores.113 Sponsors
knew that they had to accept bad loans to preserve business relationships with
loan originators, so they disregarded due diligence standards and accepted poorquality loans.114 They also abandoned basic due diligence tasks, such as
determining the reasonableness of income in a stated-income loan.115 Sponsors
would uncover problematic loans, but they would still accept them into RMBS
trusts. One study shows that up to 65% of the loans accepted into securitizations
violated underwriting guidelines, but RMBS sponsors knowingly included
them.116 The poor quality of loans does not satisfy REMIC requirements.117
2.

Failed Appraisal Function

Pressure to produce loans also caused the appraisal function to fail. The
failure of the appraisal function resulted in misstated loan-to-value (LTV) ratios
of securitized loans. The LTV ratio is one of the most important measures of the
riskiness of a loan. Loans with high LTV ratios are more likely to default because
108
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the owners have less interest in a property with a high LTV ratio.118 For example,
if the loan is 90% of a $150,000 property, the owner’s interest in the property is
only $15,000 ($150,000 x 10%), giving the owner ten percent equity. On the other
hand, if the LTV ratio is 60%, the owner’s interest is $60,000 ($150,000 x 40%).
Thus, the owner with an LTV ratio of 60% would lose more than an owner with
an LTV ratio of 90%, if the owner of the mortgage foreclosed. An RMBS trust is
also much less likely to recover the amount of a loan in a foreclosure sale if a
borrower with a high LTV ratio defaults on a loan.119
An important aspect of the LTV ratio is the appraised value of the
property securing the loan. To help ensure that the appraised value was high
enough to meet the representations in the RMBS offering materials, sponsors
pressured originators and originators pressured appraisers to help ensure that the
appraised values met the sponsors’ requirements.120 In fact, a 2007 study reported
that 90% of appraisers had been pressured to raise property valuations.121
Originators blacklisted appraisers who refused to inflate collateral values, and
sponsors instructed due diligence vendors not to review appraisals.122 As a result
of these measures, appraisers increased the stated appraisal value of collateral
80% of the time that originators requested reconsideration.123
The failed appraisal function caused the LTV ratio of numerous loans to
be much higher than sponsors represented. Widespread and systematic
overvaluations by mortgage originators created a snowball effect that inflated
appraised housing prices across the country.124 To illustrate, an appraiser might
overvalue a home by 10% based upon comparable sales and a few months later
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overvalue a similar home by an additional 10% based on the recent appraisal.125
Through this cumulative process, appraisals significantly contributed to a run-up
in property values.126 For example, the LTV ratio of a $100,000 loan would be
about 90% of the property’s value, were the value $111,000. If the appraiser
overstated the value by 10%, so the property’s value appeared to be $122,000, the
LTV ratio for the $100,000 loan would appear to be about 82%, instead of 90%.
An additional 10% overstatement on a similar home would give it an appraised
value of $134,000. A $100,000 loan on such property would have a 75% LTV
ratio. The cumulative process of poor appraisal practices thus had a significant
effect on LTV ratios.
Other practices, such as the use of piggy-back loans (i.e., second or third
loans issued on the acquisition of a property to help ensure that the LTV ratio of
the first mortgage does not exceed 80% of the value of the collateral) also affected
the LTV ratios. A loan with an LTV ratio of less than 80% has a low LTV ratio
and is a desirable loan, but a loan is underwater if it has an LTV ratio greater than
100% (i.e., the loan exceeds the value of the property).127 RMBS sponsors
routinely overstated the percentage of loans that they securitized with low LTV
ratios and understated the percentage of loans that were underwater.128 In fact
studies of loans in numerous RMBS trusts found that the RMBS sponsors
routinely represented that the pools had no underwater loans.129 Samples of the
loans in those pools showed, however, that a material portion of loans from the
studied pool was underwater, with percentages of underwater loans in several
pools exceeding 10% and some exceeding 30%.130 Not surprisingly, RMBS
sponsors, who made it their business to know this industry, appeared to be aware
of the inflated appraisals and the effect they had on LTV ratios.131 Nonetheless,
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See Stichting Complaint, supra note 114, at 78 (citing the testimony of Richard Bitner, a
former executive of a subprime mortgage originator).
126
See, e.g., id.; FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 18, 91-92.
127
See, e.g., Stichting Complaint, supra note 114, at 81; FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION,
supra note 3, at 404.
128
See Stichting Complaint, supra note 114, at 81–82 (presenting data that shows one RMBS
promoter overstated the percentage of loans with low LTV ratios by as much as 42%, and
understated loans that were underwater by as much as 40%); JPMorgan Amended Complaint,
supra note 104, at 138–142 (presenting data that shows RMBS promoters routinely overstated the
loans with low LTV ratios and understated the percentage of underwater loans).
129
See JPMorgan Amended Complaint, supra note 104, at 138–142; Stichting Complaint, supra
note 114, at 28-29.
130
See JPMorgan Amended Complaint, supra note 104, at 138–142; Nordbank Consolidated
Complaint, supra note 93, at 28-29.
131
See, e.g., Stichting Complaint, supra note 114, at 79–82.

26

15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. ____ (forthcoming 2014)

they populated RMBS trusts with undersecured loans.132 Those actions undermine
REMIC classification.133
3.

Failure to Screen and Cure Delinquent Loans

In addition to the other defects described above, RMBS sponsors knew
that the delinquency and default rates of securitized loans were much higher than
they represented or that the loans would become delinquent shortly after
securitization.134 For example, RMBS sponsors would transfer loans to trusts prior
to the expiration of the early payment-default period (the 30- to 90-day period
following the purchase of a loan during which the sponsor could force the
originator to repurchase a delinquent or default loan).135 Transferring loans to
trusts before the expiration of the early payment-default period greatly increases
the likelihood that the loans will go into default while in the RMBS trust.136
Sponsors also knew that loans from certain originators had high delinquency
rates, but they continued to purchase loans from those originators and securitize
them.137 In fact, sponsors recognized that a significant portion of the loans that
they were securitizing were 30 or more days delinquent, but they continued to
transfer them to trusts and sell securities in the trusts.138
Despite high delinquency rates,139 RMBS sponsors did not enforce
repurchase provisions of the PSAs.140 Instead, sponsors and originators would
collude to skirt repurchase provisions of the PSA for their own gain at the expense
of the RMBS investors. RMBS sponsors supposedly adopted quality control
measures to determine whether the loans maintained their quality after being
transferred to the trust.141 If a loan was in default prior to the end of the early
payment-default period, it would be defective and covered by the PSA’s
repurchase provision.142 Instead of enforcing the repurchase provision and
132

Dexia, 12 Civ. 4761, at 15.
See infra Part III. B.
134
See, e.g., Dexia, 12 Civ. 4761, at 13–14; J. P. Morgan Securities Complaint, supra note 7, at
25–26.
135
See Amended Complaint, Dexia SA/NV v. Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc, No. 650180/2012, at 23
(May 18, 2012).
136
See id. at 23–24.
137
See J. P. Morgan Securities Complaint, supra note 7, at 11 (claiming that the sponsor knew that
the almost 60% of an originator’s loans were 30 or more days delinquent, but they continued to
purchase loans from that originator).
138
See id. (referring to securitization as a “SACK OF SHIT” and “shit breather” because the loans
the sponsor was securitizing were so terrible).
139
See, e.g., Dexia, supra note 110, at 7.
140
See J. P. Morgan Securities Complaint, supra note 7, at 25–28.
141
See KRAVITT, supra note 52, § 16.04.
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See id.
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removing defective loans from the RMBS trust, however, a sponsor would enter
into confidential settlements with originators at a fraction of the loan’s original
price.143 The sponsor could then pocket the settlement payment and leave the
defective loan in the RMBS trust.144 Not only did such behavior deprive RMBS
investors of assets that were rightfully theirs, the behavior also demonstrates that
RMBS sponsors were well aware that the loans they were securitizing were well
below the quality they represented in the offering materials. These practices could
deny RMBS trusts REMIC classification.145
E.

Realistic Hypothetical RMBS Trust

The information from numerous sources paints a bleak picture of the state
of the RMBS industry and reveals that a significant percentage of the products
that RMBS sponsors sold during the years leading up to the Financial Crisis were
rubbish. Until plaintiffs exhaust their investigations through discovery, try cases
with respect to specific RMBS trusts, and courts decide such cases and publish the
facts, the general public cannot know with specificity all of the bad acts that
RMBS organizers engaged in with respect to any single RMBS trust. Nonetheless,
information in the news media, academic studies, court filings, and government
reports provide the basis for constructing a realistic hypothetical RMBS trust.
Many, perhaps the vast majority of, RMBS trusts created in the years leading up
to the Financial Crisis appear to have had significant defects. This information
provides the opportunity to create a realistic hypothetical. Undoubtedly, some
trusts would not suffer from all of the ills that afflict the hypothetical trust.
Nonetheless, no serious observer would dispute the almost certain possibility that
trusts like the realistic hypothetical trust were formed and continue to exist. The
following realistic hypothetical trust provides the opportunity to apply the REMIC
requirements to an RMBS trust created prior to the Financial Crisis. The analysis
reveals the almost certain impossibility that such a trust could be a REMIC. It also
provides a blueprint that the IRS (or private parties in qui tam or whistleblower
cases) can follow to challenge REMIC classification. A similar analysis would
apply to other RMBS trusts that may not be as defective as this hypothetical
RMBS trust.
Characteristics of Realistic Hypothetical Second-Lien RMBS Trust
 The sponsor issued RMBS in the hypothetical trust in early 2007.
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See, e.g., J. P. Morgan Securities Complaint, supra note 7, at 25–28.
See id.
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See infra Part III. B.
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III.

The sponsor did not transfer any of the mortgage notes or assign any of the
mortgages to the RMBS trust within three months after the date it issued
the RMBS securities to investors.
The mortgages in the RMBS were recorded in MERS’s name as nominee
for the originators, but there is no public record of the assignment of the
mortgages to the RMBS trust.
An affiliate of the originator serviced the mortgage notes.
The RMBS trust consists only of second-lien loans.
The loans that the RMBS trust purportedly owns have the following
composition:
o The originator did not obtain verification of the borrowers
employment for 75% of the loans;
o The LTV ratio for of 75% of the loans exceeded 100% on the date
of formation;
o Within the early payment-default period, 66% of the loans were in
default, but the sponsor made no effort to remove the loans from
the RMBS trust.
o The occupancy rate of the collateral was significantly lower than
the occupancy rate represented in the offering materials.
The loans that the RMBS trust purportedly owns were geographically
diverse, with loans from all or many of the fifty states.
The RMBS sponsor would not require the originator to repurchase
defective loans and would retain settlement proceeds received from the
originator from defective loans.
REMIC QUALIFICATION

With a somewhat clear picture of the RMBS industry in the years leading
up to the Financial Crisis, and with a realistic hypothetical trust to examine
closely, the analysis turns to the tax aspects of REMICs. Federal tax treatment of
REMICs is important in two respects. First, it specially classifies REMICs as
something other than tax corporations, tax partnerships, or trusts and generally
exempts REMICs from federal income taxation.146 Second, it treats regular
interests in REMICs as debt instruments.147 These two characteristics provide
REMICs and their investors favorable tax treatment. REMICs must compute
taxable income, but because the regular interests are treated as debt instruments,
REMICs deduct from their gross income amounts that constitute interest

146
147

See I.R.C. § 860A(a).
See I.R.C. §§ 860B(a), 860C(b)(1)(A).
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payments to the holders of regular interests.148 Without these rules, a REMIC
would most likely be a tax corporation and the regular interests could be equity
interests.149 If that were the case, the REMIC would not be able to deduct
payments made to the regular interest holders and, as a taxable C corporation,
would owe federal income tax on a very significant amount of taxable income.150
Thus, REMIC classification provides significant tax benefits.
To obtain REMIC classification, an RMBS trust must satisfy several
requirements.151 Of particular interest in this context is the requirement that within
three months after the trust’s startup date substantially all of the RMBS trust
assets must be qualified mortgages or permitted investments (the substantially-all
test).152 Mortgage notes would not come with the definition of permitted
investment, so this Article focuses on whether an RMBS trust’s assets would be
qualified mortgages.153 REMIC classification thus has four requirements: (1) the
ownership requirement (the RMBS trust must be the tax owner of qualified
mortgages), (2) the qualified-mortgage requirement (the assets of the RMBS trust
must be qualified mortgages), (3) a timing requirement (the RMBS trust must
own a static pool of qualified mortgages within three months after the RMBS
startup date), and (4) the substantially-all requirement (the RMBS trust’s assets
must be almost exclusively qualified mortgages).
Congress and Treasury designed the REMIC classification rules for
arrangements that existed in 1986 when Congress created REMICs.154 The rules
do not address the wide scale problems of the Financial Crisis, so many of the
issues discussed in the following analysis will be issues of first impression when a
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See I.R.C. §§ 163(a), 860C(b)(1)(A); Van Brunt, supra note 31, at 168 (“[R]egular interests in
the REMIC shall be treated as indebtedness of the REMIC. This is one of the important advances
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principal effect of this statutory pronouncement is to ensure that relevant payments to regular
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a publicly-traded partnership (assuming its interests are publicly traded). See KRAVITT, supra note
52, § 16.04.
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See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
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See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 860D(a) (defining REMIC); 860D(b) (requiring the RMBS trust to make an
election).
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See I.R.C. § 860D(a)(4).
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See supra text accompanying notes 40-44.
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court considers them.155 A large body of law considers the question of tax
ownership in various contexts, including the ownership of obligations,156 but none
of that law considers whether a purported REMIC is the tax owner of mortgage
notes. Beyond the guidance in the regulations, no authority appears to address the
qualified-mortgage requirement, the timing requirement, or the substantially-all
requirement. Thus, existing law provides a framework for part of the analysis, but
much of the analysis is original. The extensive body of law governing tax
ownership makes the analysis of the ownership requirement larger (but no more
important) than the analysis of the other requirements.
A.

Ownership Requirement

An arrangement comes within the definition of REMIC only if it owns
qualified mortgages within the required time period (assuming none of its assets
are permitted investments).157 The federal tax definition of ownership governs
whether a purported REMIC owns qualified mortgages.158 Federal tax law does
not defer to the state-law definition of ownership, but it looks to state law to
determine parties’ rights, obligations, and interests in property.159 Tax law can
also disregard the transfer (or lack of transfer) of formal title where the transferor
retains many of the benefits and burdens of ownership.160 Courts focus on
whether the benefits and burdens of ownership pass from one party to another
when considering who is the tax owner of property.161 “To properly discern the
155

Courts are just beginning to identify the interplay between the REMIC rules, foreclosure
statutes and the laws governing the transfer of notes. See, e.g., Glaski v. Bank of America, No.
F064556 (July 31, 2013 Cal. 5th App. Dist.).
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See infra Part III. A.
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See I.R.C. § 860 D(a)(4) (requiring substantially all of a purported REMIC’s assets to be
qualified mortgages or permitted investments within three months after the startup date).
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See Bradley T. Borden & David J. Reiss, Beneficial Ownership and the REMIC Classification
Rules, 28 TAX MGMT. REAL EST. J. 274 (Nov. 7, 2012).
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See, e.g., Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932) (“The state law creates legal interests,
but the federal statute determines when and how they shall be taxed. We examine [state] law only
for the purpose of ascertaining whether the leases conform to the standard with the taxing statute
prescribes for giving the favored treatment to capital gains.”); United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S.
190, 197 (1971).
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See Bailey v. Comm’r, 912 F2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1990).
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A frequently cited case for this principle is Grodt & McKay Realty, Inc. v. Comm’r, 77 T.C.
1221, 1237 (1981). Other authorities include Sollberger v. Comm’r, 691 F.3d 1119, 1123–24 (9th
Cir. 2012); Calloway v. Comm’r, 691 F.3d 1315, 1327 (11th Cir. 2012); Kinsey v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo 2011-257. See also I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001); Tech. Adv
Memo. 98-39-001 (May 29, 1998). In Grodt & McKay Realty, Inc., the Tax Court listed eight
factors that it considered relevant in determining whether a sale occurs for tax purposes: “(1)
Whether legal title passes; (2) how the parties treat the transaction; (3) whether an equity was
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true character of [a transaction], it is necessary to ascertain the intention of the
parties as evidenced by the written agreements, read in light of the attending facts
and circumstances.”162 If, however, the transaction does not coincide with the
parties’ bona fide intentions, courts will ignore the stated intentions.163 Thus, the
analysis of ownership cannot merely look to the agreements the parties entered
into because the label parties give to a transaction does not determine its status.164
Instead, the analysis must examine the underlying economics and the attending
facts and circumstances to determine who owns the mortgage notes for tax
purposes.165
The analysis of mortgage-note ownership begins with an examination of a
fundamental indicium of owning an obligation—the right to enforce the
obligation.166 In re Kemp addressed the issue of enforceability of a mortgage note
under the uniform commercial code (U.C.C.) in the bankruptcy context.167 The
execute and deliver a deed and a present obligation on the purchaser to make payments; (5)
whether the right of possession is vested in the purchaser; (6) which party pays the property taxes;
(7) which party bears the risk of loss or damage to the property; and (8) which party receives the
profits from the operation and sale of the property.” Grodt & McKay Realty, Inc. v. Comm’r, 77
T.C. 1221, 1237–38 (1981) (internal citations omitted).
162
See Haggard v. Comm’r, 24 T.C. 1124, 1129 (1955), aff’d 241 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1956).
163
See Union Planters National Bank of Memphis v. United States, 426 F.2d 115, 117 (6th Cir.
1970) (“We do not agree that subjective intent is decisive here.”); Fairly Realty Co. v. Comm’r,
279 F.2d 701, 705 (2d Cir. 1960).
164
See Helvering v. Lazarus & Co. 308 U.S. 252, 255 (1939); Mapco Inc. v. United States, 556
F.2d 1107, 1110 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-191-20 (Dec. 20, 1979) (disregarding a lease
agreement to rule privately that an arrangement was a sale).
165
See Helvering v. F.&R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252, 255 (1939) (“In the field of taxation,
administrators of the laws, and the courts, are concerned with substance and realities, and formal
written documents are not rigidly binding.”); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 470 (1935);
Wash. Mut. Inc. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1207, 1218 (9th Cir. 2011) (“As an overarching
principle, absent specific provision, the tax consequences of any particular transaction must reflect
the economic reality.”); Lazarus v. Comm’r, 513 F.2d 824, 829 n. 9 (9th Cir. 1975) (“‘Technical
considerations, niceties of the law of trusts or conveyances, or the legal paraphernalia which
inventive genius may construct’ must not frustrate an examination of the facts in the light of
economic realities.” (citing Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940)); Union Planters, 426
F.2d at 118 (“In cases where the legal characterization of economic facts is decisive, the principle
is well established that the tax consequences should be determined by the economic substance of
the transaction, not the labels put on it for property law (or tax avoidance) purposes.” (citing
Comm’r v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 266–67 (1958), Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465
(1935)).
166
See JAMES M. PEASLEE & DAVID Z. NIRENBERG, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
SECURITIZATION TRANSACTIONS AND RELATED TOPICS 80 (4th ed. 2011) (“The power to control
encompasses the right to take any of the actions relating to a debt instrument that may be taken by
its owner, including enforcing or modifying its terms or disposing of the asset.”).
167
See In re Kemp, 440 B.R. 624 (Bkrtcy.D.N.J. 2010). A claim in bankruptcy is disallowed after
an objection “to the extent that . . . such claim is unenforceable against the debtor and property of
the debtor, under any agreement or applicable law for a reason other than because such claim is
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court held that a note was unenforceable against the maker of the note and the
maker’s property under the U.C.C. on two grounds.168 The court held that the
alleged owner of the note, BNY, could not enforce the note because it did not
have possession and because the note lacked proper indorsement.169 Recognizing
that the mortgage note came within the U.C.C. definition of negotiable
instrument,170 the court considered who is entitled to enforce a negotiable
instrument under the U.C.C.171 The three types of persons entitled to enforce a
negotiable instrument are: (1) “the holder of the instrument, [2] a nonholder in
possession of the instrument who has the right of a holder, or [3] a person not in
possession of the instrument who is entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to
[U.C.C. § 3-309 or 3-301(d)].”172 The court then explained why BNY was not a
person entitled to enforce the mortgage note.
First, the court described why BNY was not the holder of Mr. Kemp’s
note. A holder is “the person in possession if the instrument is payable to bearer
or, in the case of an instrument payable to an identified person, if the identified
person is in possession.”173 A person does not qualify as a holder by merely
possessing or owning a note.174 Instead, a person becomes a holder through
“negotiation.”175 The two elements of negotiation are (1) transfer of possession to
the transferee and (2) indorsement by the holder.176 The court recognized that
because BNY never came into physical possession of the note, it was not the
holder.177 It also recognized that the indorsed allonge was not affixed to the
contingent or unmatured.” See id. at 629 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1). New Jersey adopted the
U.C.C. in 1962. CLARK E. ALPERT ET AL., GUIDE TO NEW JERSEY CONTRACT LAW § 1.3.2 (2011).
This article cites to the U.C.C. generally instead of specifically to the New Jersey U.C.C. to
illustrate the general applicability of the holding. Other courts have reached conclusions similar to
the Bankruptcy Court’s opinion. See, e.g., Cutler v. U.S. Bank National Association 109 So. 3d
224 (Fla. App. 2d Dist. 2012) (holding that if a bank could not establish that it was the holder of
the mortgage note or allonge that took effect prior to the date of the complaint, it did not have
standing to bring a foreclosure claim).
168
See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 629–30.
169
See id. at 629–30.
170
See id. at 630 (citing the definition of “negotiable instrument” in [U.C.C. § 3-104]: “an
unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, with or without interest or other
charges described in the promise or order, if it: (1) is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is
issued or first comes into possession of a holder; (2) is payable on demand or at a definite time.”).
171
See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 630.
172
See U.C.C. § 3-301.
173
See U.C.C. § 1-201(20).
174
See Adams v. Madison Realty & Dev. Inc., 852 F.2d 163, 166 (3d Cir. 1988).
175
See U.C.C. § 3-201(a).
176
See U.C.C. § 3-201(b).
177
See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 630 (citing Dolin v. Darnall, 115 N.J.L. 508, 181 A. 201 (E&A 1935)
(“Since the plaintiff was not ‘in possession of’ the notes in question, he was neither the ‘holder’
nor the ‘bearer’ thereof.”). The court also rejected the claim that the Bank of New York was in
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original note until the second trial date (the first trial date is relevant for
determining rights), so BNY also failed to satisfy the second element.178 Thus, to
have the rights of enforcement as holder, a person must be in possession of an
indorsed note at the time when holder status is important. Based on the
information presented above, many RMBS trusts, including the hypothetical
second-lien RMBS trust, would not be holders of many of the mortgage notes
they claim to own.
Second, the court described why BNY was not a non-holder in
possession.179 The U.C.C. provides that “[a] person may be a person entitled to
enforce the instrument even though the person is not the owner of the instrument
or is in wrongful possession of the instrument,”180 which would include a person
in possession who is not a holder.181 Therefore, a person can be a nonholder in
possession if the person acquires an unendorsed note as a successor to a holder of
the note.182 The court recognized that BNY was a successor to a holder and would
qualify as a non-holder in possession, if it had possession of the note.183 Because
BNY lacked possession, however, it was not a non-holder in possession.184 Many
RMBS trusts, including the hypothetical second-lien RMBS trust, would similarly
fail to be non-holders in possession of many of the mortgage notes they claim to
own.
Finally, the court concluded that BNY was not a non-holder not in
possession that could enforce the note.185 A non-holder not in possession of a note
can enforce a note that is lost, destroyed, or stolen.186 To enforce the note under
these rules, however, the person must satisfy three requirements.187 First, prior to
the loss, the person must have been in possession of the note and have been
entitled to enforce it when the loss of possession occurred.188 Second, the loss of
possession cannot have been the result of transfer by the person or a lawful
seizure.189 Third, the person must be unable to reasonably obtain possession
because the instrument was destroyed, the person cannot determine its
whereabouts, or it is in the wrongful possession of an unknown person or a person
constructive possession of the note because the U.C.C. requires actual possession. See Kemp, 440
B.R. at 631 n.13 (citing N.J.S.A. § 12A:1-201(20)).
178
See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 631.
179
See id. at 632.
180
See U.C.C. § 3-301.
181
See U.C.C. § 3-301 Comment.
182
See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 632; U.C.C. § 3-301 Comment.
183
See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 632.
184
See id. at 632.
185
See id. at 633.
186
See U.C.C. § 3-309 .
187
See U.C.C. § 3-309(a).
188
See id.
189
See id.
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that cannot be found or is not amenable to service of process.190 Finding that BNY
was never in possession of the note, the court held that it was not a non-holder not
in possession. Considering common practices of the times, many RMBS trusts,
including the hypothetical second-lien RMBS trust, will also fail to be nonholders not in possession.191
Another important aspect of the court’s decision in In re Kemp is the
discussion regarding the difference between ownership of a note and the right to
enforce the note. The court recognized that the recorded assignment of the
mortgage evidenced an attempt to assign the note, and the PSA provided for an
assignment of the note.192 The court acknowledged that those documents “created
an ownership issue, but did not transfer the right to enforce the note.”193 “The
right to enforce an instrument and ownership of the instrument are two different
concepts.”194 The U.C.C. acknowledges that a person may transfer all right, title,
and interest in a note to a transferee, which gives the transferee a claim to
ownership of the note.195 The transferee is not, however, entitled to enforce the
note until the transferee obtains possession of it, so transfer of the instrument
occurs only when the transferor delivers it to the transferee.196 Thus, the court
concluded that BNY had a valid claim to ownership, but did not have the right to
enforce the note.197 Based upon sworn testimony, originators retained possession
of mortgage notes as a matter of course.198 Because many RMBS trusts, including
the hypothetical second-lien RMBS trust, did not have possession of the mortgage
notes on the startup date, or three months thereafter, they could not enforce the
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See id.
See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 632–33. Kemp cites Marks v. Braunstein, 439 B.R. 248 (D.Mass. 2010),
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See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 624.
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See id.
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See id.
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notes during that relevant time period. Thus, they lacked an important indicium of
ownership at the relevant time.
Courts and the IRS have considered note ownership for tax purposes in
other contexts and a number of cases and rulings provide additional guidance for
considering who owns the notes and mortgages. The IRS derived eight factors
from the cases that courts consider to determine whether the benefits and burdens
of an obligation pass from one party to another.199 The respective factors do not
have any particular weight, and the circumstances will determine which factors
are the most important.200 In fact, “an exclusive list of factors risks overformalizing the concept of ‘sale,’ hamstrings a court’s effort to discern a
transaction’s substance and realities in evaluating tax consequences.”201 Thus,
courts may apply a flexible, case-by-case analysis to determine whether benefits
and burdens have transferred.202 The economics of a transaction may, however,
dictate that only the risk of loss and potential for gain have real significance, and
then only to the extent that they are economically realistic.203 Thus, the factors aid
with the analysis, but they are not definitive. The following analysis illustrates,
however, that many of the benefits and burdens of owning mortgage notes did not
transfer to many RMBS trusts, including the hypothetical second-lien RMBS
trust.
(1)

Did parties treat the transaction as a sale?

The first factor is whether the parties treat the transactions as a sale.204
Courts and the IRS consider many different variables when deciding whether
parties treat a transaction as a sale. For example, they look at the agreement
between the parties to help determine whether the parties treat the transaction as a
sale.205 In the case of purported REMICs that were part of MERS-facilitated
securitizations, the PSA provided that the originator would transfer the mortgage
notes and the purported REMIC trust would acquire them.206 PSAs also provide
199

See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001); Tech. Adv Memo. 98-39-001
(May 29, 1998).
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See Calloway 691 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2012): Sollberger v. Comm’r, 691 F.3d 1119, 1124–25
(9th Cir. 2012); I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001).
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See Sollberger, 691 F.3d at 1124 (citing Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 573
(1978) and Lazarus v. Comm’r, 513 F.2d 824, 829 n.9 (9th Cir. 1975)).
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See Sollberger, 691 F.3d at 1124 (citing Gray v. Comm’r, 561 F.2d 753, 757 (9th Cir. 1977)).
203
See Tech. Adv Memo. 98-39-001 (May 29, 1998) (focusing on risk of loss in a typical high
quality auto loan securitization).
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See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001).
205
See United Surgical Steel Co. v. Comm’r, 54 T.C. 1215, 1220–22, 30 (1970).
206
See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 627; Knights of Columbus Amended Complaint, supra note 45, at 11–
17.
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that mortgage servicers and REMIC trustees will verify the transfer of the
mortgage notes and grant the REMICs legal recourse to obtain untransferred
notes.207 The agreements may, however, be inconclusive because they may have
conflicting positions.208 Courts and the IRS will also ignore the agreement if other
actions by the parties and the economics of the arrangement belie the nominal
description in the documents.209 Instead, they consider whether the purported
transferee parted “with any substantial incident of ownership . . . of the
obligation,” 210 and they will consider whether the purported transferee “retained
title to, and possession of, the . . . obligations.”211
Originators commonly retained possession of the mortgage notes, so in
that respect, the parties did not treat the transaction as a transfer.212 Sponsors also
disregarded the repurchase provisions of the PSAs and instead of purging RMBS
trusts of defective loans, they agreed to receive settlement proceeds from the
originators.213 Thus, the PSAs provide for the transfer of possession of the
mortgage notes but the parties routinely disregarded the provisions of the PSA,
and uniformly did in the hypothetical second-lien RMBS trust. The actions of the
parties therefore conflict with the agreement, and actions should trump the
agreement.
Courts and the IRS will also look at how the parties treat the transaction
for tax and accounting purposes to determine tax ownership.214 For federal
income tax and accounting purposes, the parties appear to have treated the RMBS
trust as both owner and non-owner. With no information to the contrary, this
analysis assumes that the parties allocated the cash flows from borrowers to the
trusts, and the trusts paid those amounts to the RMBS investors. The RMBS trusts
also presumably recognized interest income from the loans and deducted interest
paid to the RMBS investors. Presumably, they also allocated phantom income to
207

See Knights of Columbus Amended Complaint, supra note 45, at 21–22.
See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001) (finding language in a servicing
agreement that treated the transaction as a sale and language in the private placement
memorandum that treated the transaction as a financing arrangement).
209
See Haggard v. Comm’r, 241 F.2d 288, 289 (9th Cir. 1956) (“The intent of the parties was
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See Town & Country Food Co. v. Comm’r, 51 T.C. 1049, 1057 (1969).
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See id.
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See supra text accompanying note 198.
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See supra text accompanying notes 140-144.
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See Sollberger, 691 F.3d at 1122, 1125 (recognizing that the parties stopped reporting interest
earned on the purported collateral and the purported borrower stopped making interest payments);
United Surgical Steel Co., 54 T.C. at 1221–22; Yancey Bros. Co. v. United States, 319 F. Supp.
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(Apr. 20, 2001).
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the holders of the residual interests. In those ways, the parties treated the RMBS
trusts as tax owners of the mortgage notes.
Nonetheless, the originators and sponsors knew that a significant
percentage of the loans were defective, but they did not replace them.215 Instead,
they agreed between themselves to settle the originator’s repurchase price and
deprive the RMBS investors of their right to the funds.216 Thus, they knew that the
loans were worth less than the amount accounted for, but they did not adjust their
tax accounting accordingly. In this respect, the parties treated someone other than
the RMBS trust as tax owner of the mortgage notes.
Taxes also include recording fees that parties must pay to record the
transfer of a mortgage note or mortgage. The parties treated the transaction as
something other than a sale for state fee recording purposes. Many mortgages
recorded by MERS provide that MERS is nominee or agent of the mortgagee’s
successors or assigns, but the parties often would not record the assignment of the
mortgage note to the RMBS trust.217 Apparently the parties generally would not
record mortgage assignments to avoid paying recording fees and taxes at the time
of the purported transfers from the originator to the trust.218 Consequently, for
state recording fee purposes, the parties treated the originator or MERS as the
owner of the mortgage note, but not the trust. Local jurisdictions now seek
recording fees for unrecorded assignments of mortgage notes.219 Failure to record
the transfer of a mortgage note to RMBS trusts is another way in which the parties
treated someone other than the RMBS trusts as tax owner.
(2)

Were obligors notified of transfer of obligations?

The second factor is whether the parties notify the obligor of the transfer
of obligations.220 Failure to notify the obligor of a transfer of an obligation
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See supra text accompanying notes 140-144.
See id.
217
See supra text accompanying notes 54-57.
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See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 628 (recording assignment of mortgage twenty-one months after the
parties executed the PSA and the originator purportedly transferred the note and the trust acquired
it); Christian County Clerk v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 2013 WL 565198,
slip op. No. 12-5237 (6th Cir. 2013) (dismissing case brought by county clerks in Kentucky
seeking recording fees from MERS and banks); Montgomery County, Pennsylvania v.
MERSCORP, Inc., 904 F.Supp.2d 436 (E.D. Penn. 2012) (denying MERS’s motion to dismiss
counties’ claim for recording fees).
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See, e.g., Christian County Clerk, 2013 WL 565198 (dismissing case brought by county clerks
in Kentucky seeking recording fees from MERS and banks); Montgomery County, 904 F.Supp.2d
436 (denying MERS’s motion to dismiss counties’ claim for recording fees).
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See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 9839-001 (May 29, 1998).
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generally indicates that the transaction was not a transfer.221 Case law and rulings
do not expound on this factor, but its application appears to be straight forward. In
the case of securitized mortgage notes, the obligors are the borrowers. The
originators could notify the obligor of a transfer by direct communication or
public notice. The originator arguably could provide public notice by recording
the transfer in county records. Indeed, the purpose of recording transfers of
mortgages is to put the public (including the obligor) on notice to prevent multiple
claims for the same note.222 In fact, many of the legal conflicts arise because
obligors are unsure of who holds the mortgage note and who has the right to bring
foreclosure actions on the property. By failing to record the assignment of
mortgages or providing other notification, the parties failed to notify the obligor
of a transfer of the obligation. This factor suggests the RMBS trusts, including the
hypothetical second-lien RMBS trust, were not the tax owners of the mortgage
notes.
(3)

Which party serviced the obligations?

The third factor considers which party serviced the obligations.223
Generally, the originator, or an entity affiliated with the originator, services an
RMBS trust’s mortgage notes.224 The originator’s continuing to service an
obligation generally would indicate that the originator is the tax owner of the
note.225
(4)

Did payments to the transferee correspond to collections on the debt
instruments?

The fourth factor is whether payments made to the purported transferee
correspond to collections on the debt instrument.226 If payments to the transferee
correspond to collections on the obligations, the transaction is more likely to be
221

See United Surgical Steel Co., 54 T.C. at 1230 (“As far as the customer knew, the [originator]
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See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 627 (providing that the PSA named Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., as
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See United Surgical Steel Co., 54 T.C. at 1229–30 (“The [originator] continued to handle all
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customer and the bank.”); Town & Country Food Co., 51 T.C. at 1057 (“[The originator] collected
payments as they became due and deposited them in its own bank account.”).
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See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 9839-001 (May 29, 1998).
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treated as a transfer,227 but courts have stated that corresponding payments are not
dispositive.228 PSAs generally required the originator (so long as it retains the
servicing rights) to collect payments from obligors and deliver them to the RMBS
trust or the RMBS investors net of appropriate fees,229 so if record-keeping was
accurate and borrowers made scheduled payments on the notes, the payments to
the transferee would generally correspond to collections. Such payments would
therefore indicate that RMBS trusts were tax owners.
PSAs also provide that originators are obligated to repurchase or replace
defective loans.230 Sponsors would, however, not enforce repurchase obligations
and would retain settlement payments paid by originators to compensate for
defective mortgage notes.231 Repurchase payments are one type of payment on the
loans, and the RMBS trusts would not receive those payments. Because payments
to RMBS trusts did not correspond with the collections by the sponsor of
repurchase settlement proceeds, such actions would suggest that some RMBS
trusts, including the hypothetical second-lien RMBS trust, were not the tax
owners of the mortgage notes.
(5)

Did the transferee impose restrictions on the operations of the transferor
that are consistent with a lender-borrower relationship?

The fifth factor considers whether the transferee imposes restrictions on
the operations of the transfer that are consistent with a lender-borrower
relationship.232 Case law holding that transactions were loans secured by notes
and not transfers of the notes often considered the restrictions the lenders placed
on the borrowers to help secure repayment of the loan and protect the collateral.233
Such restrictions include keeping records in a manner that satisfies a lender;
allowing the lender to audit the books of the borrower; furnishing financial
statements to the lender periodically; paying taxes as they become due; keeping
the collateral insured; requiring approval for other purchases; and restricting the
payment of compensation, creation of other indebtedness, and the payment of
227

See Branham v. Comm’r, 51 T.C. 175, 180 (1968).
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See id. § 16.04.
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States, 319 F. Supp. 441, 446 (1970).
228

40

15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. ____ (forthcoming 2014)

dividends.234 Distinctive restrictions also include margin account payment
requirements and requirements to maintain a certain ratio of collateral to debt.235
A borrower’s need to satisfy such requirements and ability to borrow additional
funds using the same debt as collateral further evinces the arrangement is a loan,
not a transfer.236 To apply this factor the analysis would consider whether the
RMBS trust or sponsor (as potential lender) imposed such restrictions on the
originator. PSAs do not appear to explicitly restrict the originator’s operations.
Thus, this factor appears to indicate that RMBS trusts were tax owners of the
mortgage notes.
(6)

Which party had power of disposition?

The sixth factor considers who has the power to dispose of an
obligation.237 The lack of restrictions on the sale of a note suggests power of
disposition.238 Arrangements that clearly allowed one party to dispose of notes,
even if in the possession of another party, also suggest power of disposition.239
The rights to dispose of notes, to transfer the registration of the notes, and to keep
interest due on the notes point to the person who has the power to dispose of
notes.240 In cases that rely upon this factor, the originators of notes could dispose
of the notes, if they replaced the collateral or had sufficient other collateral to
secure the lender’s right to repayment.241 For example, a manufacturer could sell
notes, if the value of the remaining notes it held were sufficient to satisfy the
lender who held a security interest in the notes.242 In other cases, courts consider
whether one party has complete dominion of an asset in determining power of
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disposition.243 The RMBS arrangements do not squarely align with any of these
cases. Neither the RMBS trusts, the originators, nor the sponsors appear to have
had complete dominion over the mortgage notes.
Without possession of the mortgage notes, a person obviously cannot
transfer possession of the notes. An RMBS trust that did not have possession of
notes could sell the rights it had under the PSAs to receive payments, but it could
not transfer all of the interests and rights in negotiable mortgage notes prior to
taking possession of them.244 Therefore, an RMBS trust that lacks possession
cannot transfer the negotiable note to someone who would become a holder in due
course.245 A rational buyer would not pay fair market value for a negotiable note
that did not bestow upon it rights of a holder in due course. Furthermore, the
REMIC rules generally prohibit RMBS trusts from transferring any mortgage
notes.246 PSAs also generally prohibit RMBS trusts from transferring any
mortgage note they hold to ensure that they comply with the REMIC rules.247
Thus, as a practical matter, RMBS trusts probably are not able to dispose of
mortgage notes, which goes against the position that they are tax owners of the
notes.
The originator and RMBS trust would confer very different rights upon
potential purchasers of the notes. A person who purchased the note from the
originator could become a holder of the note and be entitled to enforce it.248 In
fact, the originator could sell an untransferred mortgage note to other purchasers
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who could become a holder in due course of the mortgage note.249 A holder in due
course who purchased a mortgage note from an originator following a purported
transfer to an RMBS trust would have greater rights in a mortgage note than the
RMBS trust.250 The RMBS trust’s recourse in such a situation would be against
the originator for breach of contract and possibly theft.251 Thus, the originator
who retains possession of a mortgage note has the power to dispose of the note,
but the RMBS trust only has power to transfer some of the rights under the
note.252 A good faith transferee of the mortgage note from the originator would
have more rights than a good faith transferee of the RMBS trust’s rights in the
note. In fact, as litigation proceeds and additional facts emerge, finding that
originators sold single notes to multiple buyers would not be surprising.253 Neither
originators nor RMBS trusts have carte blanche to dispose of the notes, so this
factor does not appear to weigh conclusively in either direction. The factor is
probably more damning for the RMBS trusts, however, because they are seeking
tax ownership.
(7)

249

Which party bears the risk of loss?
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The seventh factor examines which party bears the risk of loss.254 This
may be the most important factor in determining who is the tax owner of a
mortgage note.255 In a private ruling, the IRS devoted considerable text to
analyzing who bears the risk of loss in a loan securitization arrangement.256 The
IRS identified both credit risk and prepayment risk as types of risk that
accompany mortgage securitization.257 Credit risk is the risk that borrowers will
not make payments as provided in the loan agreements.258 Prepayment risk is the
risk that borrowers will refinance when interest rates go down and pay off
existing mortgage notes before their maturity dates and that the holder of a note
will hold a note with a below-market yield if the interest rates go up.259 Another
risk of securitization is modification risk.260 Modification risk is the risk that the
borrower will modify the loan to reduce the amount of monthly payments.261
A mortgage securitization arrangement can transfer any combination of
such risks from the originator or provide that the originator will retain any
combination of the risks. For example, if the originator retains the most junior
tranches of certificates issued with respect to an RMBS trust or it agrees to
repurchase defective mortgages, it retains most of the credit risk.262 Many RMBS
trusts had been structured this way,263 so originators often retain the credit risk by
retaining junior RMBS tranches. The parties to a securitization arrangement can
transfer the prepayment risk and modification risk to the holders of more senior
tranches if they require RMBS trusts to use available funds to pay the holders of
senior tranches first.264 In fact, the economic incentives that accompany the
254
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different types of risk affect investors’ behavior and preferences.265 Investors who
hold senior RMBS tranches bear most of the prepayment risk; investors in junior
tranches or the originator bear most of the credit risk.266 Margin accounts,
repurchase agreements, and other mechanisms can also influence who bears the
risk of loss.267 Thus, determining who bears the risk of loss is fact-specific.
The IRS privately ruled that in a non-REMIC mortgage securitization, the
trust bore the prepayment risk and the originator bore the credit risk.268 Similarly,
originators and REMICs each bear risk. Originators of the loans conveyed to
many RMBS trusts agree to repurchase the mortgage notes that do not satisfy
underwriting requirements.269 Indeed, originators created reserves to cover the
estimated costs they would incur as a result of the risks they retained.270 Even
though RMBS sponsors retained repurchase settlement payments,271 suggesting
that the RMBS trust bore the risk of loss, courts will most likely hold the RMBS
sponsors liable for paying those proceeds to the RMBS trusts. Courts will also
likely enforce the PSAs and hold originators liable for repurchasing or replacing
the defective mortgage notes. Thus, in the case of an RMBS trust knowingly
formed with defective mortgage notes, the RMBS trust would not bear the risk of
loss of the mortgage notes. Many RMBS trusts, including the hypothetical
second-lien mortgage RMBS trust, would not bear the risk of loss of mortgage
notes.
(8)

Which party had the potential for gain?

The eighth factor considers which party had the potential for gain.272 The
IRS observed that the potential for gain is the obverse of bearing risk.273
Consequently, one might conclude that if the originator or sponsor bore the risk of
265
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loss, the RMBS trust might have the potential for gain. The application of this
factor to RMBS trusts is unclear, especially if the parties wanted to qualify for
REMIC classification. A REMIC does not have the opportunity to profit from the
disposition of mortgage notes. If the notes appreciate in value and a REMIC were
to sell the notes, any gain it recognizes would be taxed at 100%.274 Because the
tax would consume any such gain, the REMICs have no potential for gain from
the mortgage notes. The IRS has also concluded that if there is no real opportunity
for gain, “who bears the risk of loss must determine whether the transaction is a
sale or secured financing.”275 RMBS trusts appear to provide no real opportunity
for lawfully acquired gain from the mortgage notes, so the focus is on the risk of
loss instead of the potential for gain. Nonetheless, REMIC-intended RMBS trusts’
inability to profit from the disposition of mortgage notes suggests they are not the
tax owners of the mortgage notes.
Table 1 summarizes the tax-ownership analysis of the hypothetical
second-lien mortgage RMBS trust using the eight factors. The summary suggests
that the IRS could make a very strong case that many RMBS trusts, and especially
the second-lien RMBS trust, were not the tax owners of the mortgage notes.

Table 1: Summary of Factors Applied to Hypothetical
RMBS Trust
Factor
(1) Did parties
treat the
transaction as a
sale?

274
275

RMBS Trust
Owned the Note
PSA provided that
originator
transferred notes;
federal tax
accounting of
interest and
principal.

RMBS Trust Did
Direction
Not Own the Note Balance Leans
Originators
RMBS trust not
retained
tax owner.
possession of
notes; transfer not
recorded;
recording fees not
paid; sponsor
retained
settlement
payment.

See I.R.C. § 860F(a)(2)(A).
See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem.98-39-001 (May 29, 2012).
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Table 1: Summary of Factors Applied to Hypothetical
RMBS Trust
Factor
(2) Were obligors
notified of transfer
of obligation?
(3) Which party
serviced the
obligation?
(4) Did payments
to the transferee
correspond to
collections on the
debt instrument?

(5) Did the
transferee impose
restrictions on the
operations of the
transferor?
(6) Which party
had power of
disposition?

(7) Which party
bears the risk of
loss?

RMBS Trust
Owned the Note
Loan documents
may provide for
possibility of
assignment.

Principal and
interest payments
to RMBS trust
corresponded to
collections.

RMBS Trust Did
Not Own the Note
No public record
of assignment;
probably no direct
notification.
Affiliate of
originator serviced
the obligation.
Settlement
payments for
defective loans did
not correspond to
sponsor’s
collection of those
payments.

No distinctive
restrictions
imposed.

Originator could
transfer possession
of the notes.

Direction
Balance Leans
RMBS trust not
tax owner.

RMBS trust not
tax owner.
Not apparent.

RMBS trust tax
owner.

PSA restricted
RMBS trust’s right
to transfer notes;
tax law penalizes
transfers; RMBS
trust did not have
possession of
notes.
PSA obligated
trust to cure
defective loans,
and many loans
were defective.

Not apparent.

RMBS trust not
tax owner.
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Table 1: Summary of Factors Applied to Hypothetical
RMBS Trust
RMBS Trust
Owned the Note
(8) Which party has Originator could
the potential for
not dispose of
gain?
mortgage notes for
gain.
Factor

RMBS Trust Did
Direction
Not Own the Note Balance Leans
100% tax on gains RMBS trust not
from dispositions
tax owner.
prohibits RMBS
trust from
realizing gain.

In addition to applying the multiple-factor test for tax ownership to
mortgage notes, the courts and IRS may also estop purported RMBS trusts from
arguing that they are owners of notes that they do not possess. Courts and the IRS
apply a substance-over-form doctrine to disregard the form taxpayers choose, if
the form does not reflect the economic substance of the transaction.276 They
generally do not, however, allow taxpayers to rely upon a substance argument to
take a position that differs from the taxpayer’s chosen form.277 If RMBS trusts
and originators chose not to transfer the mortgage notes to the RMBS trusts, the
principle of estoppel weakens RMBS trusts’ arguments that they were tax owners
of notes of which they chose not to take possession.
Commentators anticipate that RMBS trusts may argue that the REMIC
rules merely require the REMIC to be the beneficial owner of the obligations.278
276

See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
See, e.g., Branham v. Comm’r, 51. T.C. 175 (1968) (finding that the taxpayer’s assignment of a
note was “absolute on its face” and holding that the taxpayer had transferred the note); I.R.S.
Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-39-001 (May 29, 1998) (“Taxpayer would be bound by the form of its
transactions if it were the first to assert that its transactions were [something other than the chosen
form]”).
278
See, e.g., Borden & Reiss, supra note 158 at 278; Lee A. Sheppard, The Crazy Train of
Mortgage Securitization, TAX NOTES 639, 645 (Nov. 8, 2010). Beneficial ownership often appears
in the trust context, but even in that context, it closely relates to the concept of tax ownership. See,
e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1137 (8th ed. 2004) (defining beneficial owner as “[o]ne
recognized in equity as the owner of something because use and title belong to that person, even
though legal title may belong to someone else; esp., one for whom property is held in trust.”). The
tax statute provides that qualified mortgage includes “any participation or certificate of beneficial
ownership” in an obligation. See I.R.C. § 860G(a)(3)(A). The REMIC regulations refer to
beneficial ownership in two places. First, they prohibit a disqualified organization from acquiring
beneficial ownership of a residual interest in a REMIC. See Treas. Reg. § 1.860D-1(b)(5)(i)(B).
That reference does not, of course, address the tax ownership of an obligation. Second, they
provide that the definition of “obligations secured by interests in real property” includes “other
investment trust interests that represent undivided beneficial ownership in a pool of obligations
277
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That argument is meaningless because beneficial ownership is analogous to tax
ownership, and courts apply the Grodt & McKay benefits and burdens test to
determine who is the beneficial owner of property.279 In fact, defendants in
upstream litigation acknowledge that tax ownership is the appropriate test to
apply in determining whether a purported REMIC is the owner of the
obligations.280 Beneficial ownership would be relevant to an RMBS trust only if
the originator held the mortgage note in trust for the RMBS trust.281
If an RMBS trust fails to establish that it is the tax owner of mortgage
notes, tax law must recharacterize the arrangement. If a purported REMIC
principally secured by interests in real property and related assets that would be considered to be
permitted investments if the investment trust were a REMIC.” See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(5).
That reference is clearly to an interest in a trust. If the originator holds the mortgage notes, a
purported REMIC would have to establish that the originator held the mortgage notes in trust and
that the trust was an investment trust to rely upon that rule. The documents used to create the
REMICs do not appear to make any provisions for the originator to be trustee, and the originators
probably would not come within the definition of investment trust. Furthermore, such a claim
would contradict representations in the REMIC offering documents, which did not provide that the
originator would hold the mortgage notes in trust.
279
See, e.g., Estate of Kenneth L. Lay v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2011-208, 102 T.C.M. 202 (2011)
(CCH) (“The status of the legal title to the annuity contracts does not control in determining
whether a sale occurred. Beneficial ownership, and not legal title, determines ownership for
Federal income tax purposes. Ragghianti v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 346 (1978), aff’d, without
published opinion, 652 F.2d 65 (9th Cir. 1981); Pac. Coast Music Jobbers, Inc. v. Commissioner,
55 T.C. 866, 874 (1971), aff’d., 457 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1972). The Federal income tax
consequences of property ownership generally depend upon beneficial ownership, rather than
possession of mere legal title. Speca v. Commissioner, 630 F.2d 554, 556-557 (7th Cir. 1980),
aff’g T.C. Memo. 1979-120; Beirne v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 268, 277 (1973). “'[C]ommand over
property or enjoyment of its economic benefits' * * *, which is the mark of true ownership, is a
question of fact to be determined from all of the attendant facts and circumstances.” Monahan v.
Commissioner, 109 T.C. 235, 240 (1997) (quoting Hang v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 74, 80 (1990)).
This Court has stated that “a sale occurs upon the transfer of the benefits and burdens of
ownership rather than upon the satisfaction of the technical requirements for the passage of title
under State law.” Houchins v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 570, 590 (1982). The determination of
whether the benefits and burdens of ownership have been transferred is one of fact and is based on
the intention of the parties, evidenced by their written agreements and the surrounding facts and
circumstances. Paccar, Inc. & Subs. v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 754, 777 (1985), aff’d., 849 F.2d
393 (9th Cir. 1988); Grodt & McKay Realty, Inc. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. at 1237; Ragghianti,
71 T.C. at 349. Beneficial ownership is marked by command over property or enjoyment of its
economic benefits. Yelencsics v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1513, 1527 (1980) (stock was sold in
accordance with an agreement for the sale, even though the title to the stock was not transferred, in
accordance with the agreement of the parties).”).
280
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, HSH
Nordbank v. Barclays Bank PLC, No. 652678/2011, at 24 n. 38 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County May 11,
2012), available at
https://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/fbem/DocumentDisplayServlet?documentId=xKBnC5REEodDnG7
SCCByTg==&system=prod.
281
See supra note 278.
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received and distributed proceeds, it would clearly own some sort of asset capable
of generating cash flow. That asset could be a loan from the originator, the
sponsor, or other party to the securitization. The security for such a loan could be
mortgage notes that would come within the definition of qualified mortgage. But
such a loan does not itself come within the definition of qualified mortgage.282
Because the asset would be something other than a qualified mortgage, the
arrangement would fail to be a REMIC.
This analysis suggests that a court would likely find that many RMBS
trusts, including the hypothetical second-lien RMBS trust, were not the tax
owners of mortgage notes. The facts of some RMBS trusts may nonetheless
indicate that the RMBS trust is the tax owner of the mortgage notes. In such cases
the RMBS trusts may still fail to qualify as REMICs because they fail to satisfy
the other REMIC requirements. As the following analysis indicates, the
hypothetical second-lien RMBS trust will almost certainly fail to satisfy the other
REMIC requirements. The analysis also provides a template analyzing the
REMIC classification of other RMBS trusts
B.

Qualified Mortgage Requirement

An RMBS trust must satisfy the qualified mortgage requirement to be a
REMIC.283 A qualified mortgage is an obligation that is principally secured by an
interest in real property.284 That definition has three elements: (1) obligation, (2)
principally secured, and (3) secured by an interest in real property. An asset must
satisfy all three elements to come within the definition of qualified mortgage.
Many of the assets in RMBS trusts will not come within that definition.
1.

Obligation

A qualified mortgage must be an “obligation (including any participation
or certificate of beneficial ownership therein).”285 The REMIC rules do not
specifically define obligation. The common legal definition of obligation is “[a]
legal or moral duty to do or not do something . . . . A formal, binding agreement
or acknowledgment of a liability to pay a certain amount or to do a certain thing
for a particular person or set of persons; esp., a duty arising by contract.”286 A
mortgage note would satisfy this definition of obligation because the maker of the
note agrees to pay a certain amount. An originator’s promise under a PSA to
282

See infra text accompanying notes 284-285.
See supra text accompanying notes 151-153.
284
See I.R.C. § 860G(a)(3)(A).
285
See id.
286
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1104 (8th ed. 2004).
283
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transfer mortgage notes would also come within the definition of obligation.
Participation or certificates of beneficial ownership in an obligation include “nonREMIC pass-through certificates (including senior and subordinated pass-through
certificates and IO [Interest Only] and PO [Principal Only] strips). . . .”287 A passthrough certificate is an interest in a trust or other arrangement that holds a pool
of mortgage notes or other debt instruments.288 IO and PO strips are types of
stripped bonds and coupons governed by section 1286 of the Internal Revenue
Code, which grant a holder the rights to identified payments on bonds.289 Thus, a
strip that grants an RMBS trust the right to receive certain payments due on an
obligation principally secured by an interest in real property would appear to
satisfy the definition of obligation. These rules are consistent with the general
definition of qualified mortgage, which includes any regular interest in another
REMIC.290
Because RMBS trusts received cash flow, they must have been the tax
owners of some type of property. Even if the property RMBS trusts owned was
not qualified mortgages, it could have been an obligation. For instance, it could be
an obligation from the originator to transfer mortgage notes and to transfer
payments on the notes. Such an obligation would not be a pass-through certificate,
however, unless the arrangement with the originator was a trust, which would not
appear to be the case because PSAs do not appear to create a trust on behalf of the
RMBS trust.291 Thus, the property owned by RMBS trusts would appear to be
either mortgage notes, for RMBS trusts that are the tax owners of the notes, or the
right to receive something from the originator. The property owned by an RMBS
trust could, therefore, be some kind of binding obligation, even if it is not
mortgage notes per se. Obligations in a form other than mortgage notes would
not, however, satisfy other elements of the definition of qualified mortgage. In
particular, such other obligation would not be principally secured by an interest in
real property.
2.

Principally Secured

An obligation is principally secured only if it (1) satisfies the 80% test, (2)
satisfies the alternative test, or (3) comes within the reasonable-belief safe
harbor.292 As the following discussion illustrates, the lending and underwriting
287

See Peaslee & Nirenberg, supra note 166, at 456.
See id. at 23.
289
See id. at 438. A stripped bond is a bond that separates the ownership of the bond from any
coupons or interest that have not yet come due, and a stripped coupon is the coupon related to the
bond. See id. at 701.
290
See I.R.C. § 860G(a)(3)(C).
291
See Borden & Reiss, supra note 13, at 277-279.
292
See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(1).
288
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practices during the years leading up to the Financial Crisis will prohibit many
mortgage notes from being principally secured under any of those three
alternatives. Any other obligation that an RMBS trust might hold would also fail
to satisfy any one of the tests.
a.

The 80% Test

An obligation satisfies the 80% test only if the fair market value of the
interest in real property securing the obligation is at least 80% of the adjusted
issue price of the obligation on one of the following two dates: (1) the obligation’s
origination date,293 or (2) the date the trust acquires the obligation by
contribution.294 In other words, the 80% test compares the value of the collateral
to the amount of a loan, so it considers the value-to-loan (VTL) ratio of a
mortgage note. Notice that the VTL ratio is the inverse of the LTV ratio that
RMBS sponsors and investors use. The 80% test requires the VTL ratio of a loan
to be at least 80%. Two definitions are key to computing the VTL ratio—the
definition of adjusted issue price and the definition of the fair market value of the
collateral.
The REMIC rules do not appear to define adjusted issue price of an
obligation. Instead, the rules appear to rely upon the definition “adjusted issue
price” in other areas of tax law, in particular in the original issue discount (OID)
rules.295 One such definition provides that the adjusted issue price of a debt
instrument is the instrument’s issue price at the beginning of its first accrual
period.296 The issue price for a home mortgage should be the amount of the
loan.297 After the first accrual period, the adjusted issue price is the issue price
increased by any original issue discount that any holder of the instrument included
in income and decreased by any payments other than qualified stated interest
made on the instrument.298 The adjustments that occur between the origination of
a loan and a transfer of it to an RMBS trust normally should not significantly
affect the adjusted issue price of the mortgage note because the transfers generally

293

See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(1)(i)(A). If an obligation is significantly modified before the
REMIC acquires it, its origination date is the date of the modification. See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G2(b)(1).
294
See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(1)(i)(B).
295
See Peaslee & Nirenberg, supra note 166, at 455, 58.
296
See Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-1(b)(1).
297
See I.R.C. § 1273(b)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.1273-2(g)(5), Example 1 (deducting points from the
borrower’s payment to determine issue price).
298
See Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-1(b)(1)(i), (ii).
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occur shortly after origination.299 Therefore, this analysis assumes that the
adjusted issue price is the amount of the loan.
The definition of fair market value in the 80% test applies on a propertyby-property basis. The test assigns the value of property first to senior liens. The
amount assigned to senior liens reduces the fair market value of the interest in real
property assigned to other liens.300 Other liens that are on par with the obligation
being tested further reduce the fair market value of the interest in real property in
proportion to the liens with similar priority.301 The computation of fair market
value required by these rules could cause many second-lien mortgages (and
primary mortgages for that matter) to fail to satisfy the 80% test. Inflated
appraisals were common in years leading up to the Financial Crisis,302 and will
thus cause many mortgages to fail the 80% test.
An example illustrates how senior liens can cause many second and other
subordinate liens to fail the 80% test. Assume the originator of an obligation treats
an appraised value of $250,000 as the fair market value of a house. Based upon
that appraisal, the originator lends a buyer $200,000 secured by a first-lien
mortgage on the house and $37,500 secured by a second-lien mortgage on the
house (the borrower paid the remaining $12,500 of the purchase price).303 The
appraised fair market value suggests that both the first and the second mortgages
satisfy the 80% test. For purposes of applying the test to the first mortgage, the
fair market value of the house would be the full $250,000. The VTL ratio of the
first mortgage would therefore be the $250,000 appraised value divided by the
$200,000 mortgage or 125%, which is obviously greater than the required 80%.
Because the VTL ratio is greater than 80%, the first-lien mortgage satisfies the
80% test. The fair market value apportioned to the second-lien mortgage for
purposes of the 80% test would be $50,000 ($250,000 total fair market value
minus the $200,000 first mortgage). The VTL ratio for the second mortgage
would therefore be 133% ($50,000 fair market value to $37,500 loan). Because
133% is obviously greater than the required 80%, the second mortgage would also
appear to satisfy the 80% test.
Assume that because appraisers overstated the values of homes, the
$250,000 appraised value is significantly higher than the property’s actual value.
The actual value of the house is $225,000 (just 90% of the appraised value) at the
299

See supra text accompanying note 152. Of course, failed underwriting could affect the value
and original discount of a loan. See supra text accompanying notes 120-126.
300
See Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-1(b)(2).
301
See id.
302
See supra text accompanying notes 120-126.
303
The issuance of a first and second mortgage to home purchasers was typical during the period
leading up to the economic meltdown in 2008. See Vikas Bajaj, Equity Loans as Next Round in
Credit Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (no page) (Mar. 27, 2008), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/27/business/27loan.html?pagewanted=print.
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time the buyer borrowed the first or second mortgage.304 The actual value, not the
inflated appraised value, is appropriate for the 80% test.305 Using the actual value
of the collateral, the first-lien mortgage would still satisfy the 80% test because it
would use the full $225,000 actual fair market value, which exceeds the $200,000
first mortgage. The VTL ratio for the first mortgage would be 112.5% ($225,000
value divided by the $200,000 loan). The value for purposes of the second
mortgage, however, would be the $225,000 actual value minus the $200,000 firstlien mortgage, or $25,000. The VTL ratio for the $37,500 second mortgage using
that $25,000 value would be 67% ($25,000 value divided by the $37,500 loan).
Because the 67% VTL ratio of the second-lien mortgage is less than the required
80% VTL ratio, the second-lien mortgage would not satisfy the 80% test.
Studies of mortgages suggest that more than a significant percentage of
second-lien mortgage loans would not satisfy the 80% test.306 For example, a
304

The $250,000 appraised value represents approximately 11% overstated value ($25,000 ÷
$225,000). Such inflation was not uncommon leading up to the Financial Crisis. See supra text
accompanying notes 120-126 (claiming that appraisals often overstated values by as much as 10%
on a cumulative basis).
305
See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(1)(i) (referring to fair market value of the collateral).
306
It was not uncommon for homebuyers to borrow close to 100% of the appraised value of the
home. See Dov Solomon & Odelia Minnes, Non-Recourse, No Down Payment and the Mortgage
Meltdown: Lessons from Undercapitalization, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 529, 541-542
(2011). For example, a borrower might take a first mortgage for 80% of the appraised value of the
home and a second mortgage for 20% of the appraised value of the home (an 80-20 financing).
Assuming the first mortgage was 80% of the value of the home and a second mortgage was 20%
of the value of the home with such arrangements, a 4.001% discrepancy between the appraised
value and the actual value would cause the second mortgage to fail the 80% test. For instance, if
the appraised value of a home was $100,000, the second mortgage would be for $20,000. The
VTL ratio of the second home would be less than 80% if the actual value of the home was only
$95,999 instead of the appraised $100,000. If the actual value were $95,999, to value assigned to
the $20,000 second mortgage for the purpose of the 80% test would be $15,999 ($95,999 total
actual value minus the $80,000 first mortgage). The VTL ratio of the second mortgage in such a
situation would be 79.995% ($15,999 value to $20,000 loan). These calculations suggest that if the
appraised value was just 4.2% greater than the actual value ($4,001 ÷ $95,999), the second
mortgage on a 100%-financed home would not satisfy the 80% test. Based upon reports that
appraised values were often at least 20% greater than the actual value of the homes, many
mortgages would fail to satisfy the 80% test. See, e.g., Griffin, & Maturana, supra note 3 (finding
that appraisal overstatements of at least 20% occurred in 14.5% of studied loans).
Instead of being an 80-20 arrangement, the arrangement could have been an 80-10-10
arrangement with a first mortgage equal to 80% of the home’s appraised value and a second and
third mortgage each equal to 10% of the home’s appraised value. If the first and second mortgage
had priority over the third, the third mortgage would not satisfy the 80% if the actual value was
only 2.01% less than the appraised value. To illustrate, a homebuyer would borrow $100,000 to
purchase a home with an appraised value of $100,000. The third mortgage in an 80-10-10
arrangement would be $10,000. The third mortgage would not satisfy the 80% test if the value of
the property were less than $98,000 because the actual value assigned to the third mortgage would
be the $97,999 (for example) actual value minus the $90,000 total amount of the first and second
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study examining combined loan-to-value (CLTV) ratios of pooled mortgages
indicates that many loans held by RMBS trusts may not satisfy the 80% test.307
The CLTV ratio compares the combined principal balance of all liens on the
mortgaged property to the value of the mortgaged property.308 Because LTV is the
inverse of the VTL ratio, a VTL ratio of 80% equals an LTV ratio of 125%.309 To
illustrate, assume a property with an $80,000 fair market value secures a $100,000
loan. The VTL ratio for that property and obligation would be 80% ($80,000
value divided by the $100,000 loan). The LTV ratio for that property and
obligation would, however, be 125% ($100,000 loan divided by the $80,000
value). If the VTL ratio of a property and obligation is less than 80%, the
obligation will not satisfy the 80% test. Inversely, if the LTV of a property is
greater than 125%, the obligation secured by the property will not satisfy the 80%
test. For instance, if the property’s value was $78,000, the VTL ratio would be
78% ($78,000 value divided by the $100,000 loan), and the LTV ratio would be
about 128% ($100,000 loan divided by $78,000 value). This illustrates the inverse
relationship of the VTL and the LTV ratios. To pass the 80% test, a loan’s VTL
ratio must be greater than or equal to 80%, and, inversely, the LTV ratio of a loan
must be less than or equal to 125%.
The CLTV ratio includes all mortgages secured by a piece of property, but
it does not provide information with respect to individual loans.310 A study found
that the CLTV ratio was greater than 100% for as many as 34% of the loans in
one RMBS trust.311 A CLTV of greater than 100% suggests that any secondarylien mortgages in the pool may not satisfy the 80% test. The CLTV ratio
considers all loans that a single property secures. For instance, in the example
mortgages, which would make the VTL ratio for the third mortgage less than 80% (e.g., $7,999
actual to a $10,000 loan is a only 79.99% VTL ratio).
If the mortgages in an 80-20 or 90-10-10 had equal priority, the actual value of the
property would have to be less than 80% of the appraised value for any mortgage to fail the 80%
test. For instance, the value assigned to the 80% loan in a $100,000 80-20 arrangement would be
80% of the actual value of the property, and the value assigned to the 20% loan would be 20% of
the value of the property. See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(2). If the actual value of the property
were $90,000 (90% of the appraised value), $72,000 of it would be assigned to the 80% loan,
which would have been for $80,000, so the VTL ration would be 90% ($72,000 of value to
$80,000 of mortgage). The VTL ratio for the $20,000 second mortgage would also be 90%
because $18,000 (20% of $90,000) of the value would be assigned to it.
A diversified mortgage pool that has a ratio of first and subsequent mortgages that equals
the ratio of such mortgages to the value of appraised property would most likely have more than a
de minimis amount of mortgages that fail the 80% test.
307
Nordbank Consolidated Complaint, supra note 93, at 28.
308
See Nordbank Consolidated Complaint, supra note 93, at 26.
309
See Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits, 57 F.R. 61293, T.D. 8458 (Dec. 24, 1992).
310
The CLTV ratio would also consider third mortgages and any other mortgages secured by the
property.
311
See Nordbank Consolidated Complaint, supra note 93, at 28.
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above, if the house secured a $200,000 first-lien mortgage and a $37,500 secondlien mortgage, the combined loans would be $237,500. If the value of the house
were $250,000, the CLTV ratio for the property and obligations would be about
95% ($237,500 loan divided by $250,000 value). The VTL ratio of the aggregate
loans would be about 91% ($250,000 value divided by the $237,500 loan). If,
however, the value of the property were only $225,000, the CLTV ratio would be
slightly above 100% at about 106% ($237,500 loan divided by $225,000 value).
The VLT ratio of the aggregate loans would be about 95% ($225,000 value
divided by the $237,000 loan). Nonetheless, the loan-by-loan analysis shows that
some loans may not satisfy the 80% test.
Because each loan is subject to the 80% test, a CLTV ratio of greater than
100% signals that one or more of the loans secured by the property may fail the
80% test. Failure will often result because the fair market value of the property
apportioned to the first-lien mortgage leaves a disproportionately small amount of
the property value to apportion to the other mortgages. If the first mortgage is for
$200,000 (roughly 84% of the total amount of loans) and the actual value of the
property is only $225,000, the first-lien mortgage is almost 89% of the actual
value of the property. Thus, only 11% of the value of the property is apportioned
to the second-lien mortgage for purposes of applying the 80% test to the second
mortgage. The disproportionately small amount of value assigned to the secondlien mortgage gives it a 150% LTV ratio ($37,500 loan divided by the $25,000
value) and a 67% VTL ratio ($25,000 value divided by the $37,500 loan). The
second-lien mortgage therefore would not satisfy the 80% test. In fact, loans with
lower priority that are part of a CLTV ratio that exceeds 100% would often fail
the 80% test.312
The study of CLTV ratios demonstrates that as many as 34% of randomly
selected loans have CLTV ratios of greater than 100%.313 The percent of loans in
an RMBS trust of second-lien mortgages with LTV ratios of greater than 100%
would most likely be even higher, and that fact does not bode well for REMIC
classification. For example, assume a trust holds $100,000,000 of loans, and the
CLTV ratio for 34% of the loans (based upon actual value) is greater than 100%.
With respect to $34,000,000 or 34% of the loans, a question arises about whether
some of them fail the 80% test. Assume that $5,100,000 or 15% of the loans
(based upon actual value) in that group are second-lien mortgages. If half of those
312

See supra note 306 (applying the 80% test to arrangements with a single property securing
multiple loans). As illustrated in that discussion, the structure of the arrangement will often
influence the effect of the 80% test. If all loans secured by a piece of property have equal priority,
the CLTV ratio would have to be greater than 125% for any of the loans to fail the 80% test. If one
or more loans have priority over other loans, a CLTV ratio of greater than 100% signals that one
more of the loans probably does not satisfy the 80% test.
313
See Nordbank Consolidated Complaint, supra note 93, at 28.

56

15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. ____ (forthcoming 2014)

loans fail the 80% test, $2,550,000 or 2.55% of the loans in the portfolio would
fail the 80% test. Based on the assumptions in this analysis, 2.55% of the loans in
the portfolio would not be principally secured by an interest in real property under
the 80% test. The percentage of mortgage notes that fail the 80% test would be
even greater for RMBS trusts that held only second-lien mortgage notes.
As stated above, originators pressured appraisers to inflate values 80% of
the time.314 That practice suggests that the value of collateral could have been
overstated for at least 80% of the second-lien loans. Because the effect of
overstated value of the collateral is magnified with respect to second-lien
mortgages, as many as 80% of the second-lien mortgages could have VTL ratios
that are less than 80%. If that is the case, the vast majority of second-lien
mortgages granted in the years leading up to the Financial Crisis would not pass
the 80% test. Such loans would be principally secured only if they pass the
alternative test or come within the principally-secured safe harbor.
b.

The Alternative Test

An obligation that does not satisfy the 80% test will nonetheless be
principally secured by an interest in real property if it satisfies the alternative test.
To satisfy the alternative test an obligation must meet two requirements.315 First,
substantially all of the proceeds of the obligation must be used by the borrower to
acquire, improve, or protect an interest in real property.316 Second, at the
origination date, the only security for the obligation can be the property that the
borrower acquired, improved, and protected with the loan proceeds.317 The
purpose of this test is to cover real estate construction or acquisition loans for
property for which an appraisal was not obtained at the time of the loan.318
The language in the preamble to the regulations raised the question of
whether a loan for appraised property can satisfy the alternative test if it fails the
80% test. That language provides: “[A] home improvement loan made in
accordance with Title I of the National Housing Act would be considered to
satisfy the principally secured standard even though one cannot readily
demonstrate that the loan satisfied the 80-percent test because a property appraisal
was not required at the time the loan was originated.”319 That language suggests
that the alternative test was meant only for loans that did not require an appraisal
314
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of the collateral. It does not appear to be a fall back test for loans that fail the 80%
test based on an inaccurate property value. If the collateral were appraised, the
80% test would appear to be the proper test. Thus, any loan that included an
appraisal value of the property and fails the 80% test probably cannot rely upon
the alternative test.
Many loans issued prior to the Financial Crisis will not satisfy the
alternative test. During that period, many borrowers used proceeds from home
equity loans for purposes other than acquiring, improving, and protecting interests
in real property. Estimates indicate that as many as 40% of loans issued during
years prior to the Financial Crisis were home equity loans that were not used to
acquire, improve, or protect real property.320 Many such home equity loans would
not satisfy the first part of the alternative test. Another common practice was for
borrowers to take a portion of a loan originated at the time of purchase in cash.321
If the amount of cash that the borrower received (or used for purposes other than
to acquire, improve, or protect the real property) caused the portion used to
acquire, improve, or protect the property to be less than substantial, the loan
would not satisfy the alternative test.
A loan will also fail to satisfy the alternative test if property other than the
real property that borrower acquired, improved, or protected with the loan
proceeds, secures the loan. A borrower’s personal liability for the obligation does
not violate this rule.322 If the borrower offers other property as collateral,
however, the loan would not satisfy this requirement. Determining whether loans
are secured by other property requires an examination of each loan. Even without
that examination many second-lien mortgage notes in RMBS trusts will fail the
alternative test because borrowers used the proceeds for purposes other than
acquiring, improving, or protecting the property,323 and they obtained appraisals
(albeit inaccurate appraisals) for the property, suggesting the test probably should
not apply. Consequently, especially with respect to many second-lien mortgage
notes, the mortgage notes will not satisfy the alternative test.
320

See Atif R. Mian & Amir Sufi, House Prices, Home Equity-Based Borrowing, and the U.S.
Household Leverage Crisis (Research Paper, May 21, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1397607 (“[O]ur findings are suggestive that a large fraction of home
equity-based borrowing is used for consumption or home improvement. This conclusion is
consistent with survey evidence by Brady, Canner, and Maki (2000) who find that from 1998 to
1999, 40% of households cite home improvement as a reason for home equity extraction, and 39%
cite consumer expenditures.”).
321
See Hui Chen et al., Houses as ATMs? Mortgage Refinancing and Macroeconomic Uncertainty
2 (Working Paper, June 21, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2024392 (“[A] large
fraction of refinance loans--on average about 70%-- involve ‘cash-out,’ i.e. an increase in the loan
balance and the corresponding decrease in home equity. Over the period from 1993 through 2010
U.S. households extracted over $1.7 trillion of home equity via refinancing”).
322
See Treas. Reg. § 860G-2(a)(1)(ii).
323
See supra note 321.

58

c.

15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. ____ (forthcoming 2014)

The Reasonable-Belief Safe Harbor

Obligations that fail both the 80% test and the alternative test will
nonetheless be principally secured by an interest in real property if they come
within the reasonable-belief safe harbor. The reasonable-belief safe harbor treats
an obligation as being principally secured by an interest in real property if, at the
time the sponsor contributes the obligation to a REMIC, the sponsor reasonably
believes the obligation satisfies the 80% test or the alternative test.324 The
regulations provide two methods for establishing that reasonable belief. First, a
sponsor may base reasonable belief on representations and warranties made by the
originator.325 Second, a sponsor may base a reasonable belief on evidence
indicating that the originator typically made mortgages in accordance with an
established set of parameters, and that any mortgage loan originated in accordance
with those parameters would satisfy the 80% test or the alternative test.326 The
rules also provide that the safe harbor does not apply if the sponsor actually knew
or had reason to know an obligation fails both the 80% test and the alternative
test.327 Thus, in addition to showing reasonable belief, the sponsor must be able to
show lack of actual knowledge and lack of reason to know that an obligation does
not meet one of the other tests for the obligation to qualify for safe harbor
protection.
Sponsors’ only hope to come within the reasonable-belief safe harbor is to
demonstrate that they based their reasonable belief on representations and
warranties made by the originator. They could not argue that they based their
reasonable belief on evidence indicating originators made mortgages in
accordance with established parameters that would satisfy the 80% test. Evidence
at the time indicated that originators had abandoned underwriting guidelines and
made loans that could not satisfy the 80% test.328 Sponsors also knew or had
reason to know that loans they were securitizing could not pass the 80% test. In
the years leading up to the Financial Crisis, sponsors acknowledged the low
quality of the mortgages that they were securitizing.329 Nonetheless, they
continued to put them into RMBS trusts.330
If, despite the sponsors’ reasonable belief that the notes satisfied the 80%
or alternative test, a purported REMIC later discovers an obligation is not
324
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principally secured by an interest in real property, the obligation is defective and
loses qualified mortgage status within 90 days after the date the purported REMIC
discovers the defect.331 Thus, the rules give sponsors 90 days to cure defective
loans.332 The sponsors appeared to have known that they were transferring
defective loans into RMBS trusts at the time they formed the trusts. They knew
that default rates of loans from particular originators were particularly high, but
they continued to accept loans from those originators.333 They were similarly
aware that appraisers were overstating the value of homes,334 so they knew that
many loans could not satisfy the 80% test. Surely members of the industry had to
know before reporters became aware that the mortgages and notes had serious
quality problems. Even though REMICs have the opportunity to cure defective
obligations within the 90-day window,335 nothing suggests that they took the steps
necessary to cure defective obligations. In fact, due to the collapse of the
residential real estate market as a result of the practices of RMBS sponsors,
insufficient mortgages existed to replace defectives obligations that the RMBS
trusts held. Also, sponsors colluded with originators to settle repurchase
obligations instead of exercising the trusts’ rights to cure defects by replacing
defective obligations with compliant loans.336 Consequently, the cure alternative
would not appear to help RMBS trusts establish that their notes were principally
secured. Thus, many of the mortgage notes that RMBS trusts claimed to own will
not be principally secured. The percentage of mortgage notes that fail to be
principally secured will probably be significant for second-lien mortgage RMBS
trusts.
3.

Secured By Real Property

In addition to being principally secured, an obligation held by an RMBS
trust must be secured by an interest in real property to come within the definition
of qualified mortgage.337 The regulations do not specifically define “secured by,”
but they provide a list of instruments that are secured by interests in real property.
Those instruments include mortgages, deeds of trust, installment land contracts;
mortgage pass-thru certificates guaranteed by GNMA, FNMA, FHLMC, or
CMHC; other investment trust interests; and obligations secured by manufactured
housing.338 Of the items in the list, mortgages and deeds of trust would most often
331
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be the type of security applicable to an obligation held by an RMBS trust.
Practices of the mortgage securitization industry in the years leading up to the
Financial Crisis in general and the use of MERS in particular suggest that RMBS
trusts often did not hold mortgages or deeds of trust, and they lacked the power to
enforce them.
In downstream litigation, courts in many states have considered who holds
or controls the legal rights and obligations of mortgage notes and mortgages that
are designated as RMBS trust property.339 The issues state courts have considered
with respect to mortgage notes and mortgages include standing to foreclose,340
entitlement to notice of bankruptcy proceeding against a mortgagor,341 ownership
of a mortgage note under a state’s commercial code, the right to initiate a
nonjudicial foreclosure, and liability for recording fees.342 The outcomes of these
cases vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction depending upon the issue under
consideration and the facts of a particular case. Many cases pit a borrower against
one or more banks or MERS. In many cases, the courts rule in favor of the
borrower, eliminating the rights of the bank to collect on a note or foreclose on
property; in other cases, courts have found that banks have standing.343
The outcome of such cases often turns on whether the bank initiating a
claim (or on whose behalf another party initiates a claim) holds both the mortgage
note and the mortgage at the initiation of the claim.344 In some jurisdictions,
339
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courts allow banks to foreclose if they are just the mortgagee, but other
jurisdictions require banks to have the note to initiate foreclosure.345 Banks in
every jurisdiction can obtain rights to foreclosure through possession of the
necessary documents. Because timing of their rights is important for REMIC
classification, acquisitions of the relevant rights prior to initiating legal
proceedings may not be sufficient for tax purposes.
The inability to foreclose on an obligation calls into question whether it
was secured by real property. REMICs, sponsors, originators, underwriters, and
their advisors were put on notice as early as 2001 that their positions regarding
security probably lacked legal support. In 2001, the Attorney General of New
York concluded that recording a MERS instrument violates New York real
property law.346 Even though the New York Court of Appeals (the highest court in
New York State) later ruled that the clerk had to record the MERS documents,347
that ruling put RMBS trustees and other industry participants on notice that
purported REMICs may not be able to foreclose on mortgage notes that were part
of a MERS securitization.
Some commentators claim that an obligation is secured by an interest in
real property if, after all of the agreements and rights have been enforced, the
RMBS trust will end up with the collateral real property or proceeds from the sale
of such property (the ultimate-outcome argument).348 They may argue that the
originator can transfer possession of the mortgage note and assign the mortgage to
the purported REMIC before the attempt to enforce the mortgage note through
payment collection efforts or foreclosure.349 As a general rule, courts typically
find for a bank that holds the mortgage note and the mortgage prior to
commencing a foreclosure action, but the outcome is much less predictable where
the foreclosing party does not hold both instruments when the action
commences.350 Thus, the possession of the note and ownership of the mortgage
often affect the rights of an RMBS trust.
The ultimate-outcome argument does not hold up under scrutiny. The
REMIC rules provide that an obligation is not principally secured by an interest in
real property if the obligation’s security is an interest in another obligation.351 The
fact that the collateral obligation is secured by an interest in real property does not
affect this analysis.352 Thus, if an RMBS trust holds an obligation from the
originator, and that obligation is secured by mortgage notes that the originator
345
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holds, the RMBS trust’s obligation is not principally secured by an interest in real
property. This result holds true even if the originator’s mortgage notes are secured
by interests in real property. Consequently, if an RMBS trust does not own
mortgage notes for tax purposes, but they do own an obligation from the
originator secured by the mortgage notes, the obligation that the RMBS trust
holds will not be principally secured by an interest in real property. This result
obtains even though the RMBS trust may be able to foreclose on the originator’s
mortgage notes, gain ownership and possession of them and the mortgage, and
then foreclose on the underlying real estate. The ultimate outcome of this series of
events is the RMBS trust gaining the proceeds from the sale of real property, but
the REMIC rules do not treat the RMBS trust as holding an obligation secured by
an interest in real property.
If the ultimate-outcome argument is not effective with respect to
obligations secured by obligations secured by interests in real property, it should
not be effective with respect to other obligations that require similar foreclosure
actions. Thus, the ultimate-outcome argument should not apply to obligations that
an RMBS trust cannot foreclose upon immediately. If an RMBS trust must take
actions to compel the originator to transfer the mortgage note and mortgage to
foreclose on property, the RMBS trust would not appear to own an obligation
principally secured by an interest in real property. The atrocious state of affairs
leading up to the Financial Crisis indicates that most RMBS trusts could not
foreclose on the homes securing the mortgage notes without taking additional
steps. Such would be similar to those a person would take if the person held an
obligation secured by another obligation secured by interests in real property.
Consequently, many RMBS trusts, including the hypothetical second-lien RMBS
trust, appear not to have held obligations secured by real property.
The ability to timely foreclose is critical to the underlying purpose of the
REMIC rules. As stated above, the assets of a REMIC must remain static to
enable an accurate accounting of the REMIC’s interest income and deductions.353
The inability to foreclose on the collateral of a loan impedes the static-asset
objective. If a REMIC can foreclose in a timely manner, it can restore the cash
flow from the defaulted loan with a new loan or other eligible asset.354 If,
however, the REMIC must go through numerous additional steps to foreclose, it
loses a source of cash flow for the period of time it takes to complete those
additional steps. That loss will affect the computation of income and deduction
related to the mortgage notes and interests in the REMIC. Thus, the ability to
foreclose immediately is at the heart of the REMIC rules, and the ultimateoutcome argument undermines a fundamental purpose of the rules. Consequently,
353
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courts and the IRS should, and upon careful reflection most likely would, reject
the ultimate-outcome argument.
The ultimate-outcome argument links to the timing requirement. The
argument suggests that an obligation may be secured by an interest in real
property on the date of acquisition, even if the holder of the obligation is unable to
enforce the obligation or initiate foreclosure proceedings at that time. In addition
to ignoring the purposes of the REMIC rules, this point of view appears to
disregard the timing requirement, which generally requires the RMBS trust to
hold the secured obligation on the REMIC startup date, but no later than three
months thereafter.355 The inability to foreclose on a significant portion of the
mortgage notes on the startup date (or within three months after it) indicates that
many mortgage notes in RMBS trusts were not secured by interests in real
property. Because the securitization process using MERS was so inadequate, this
problem would appear to apply equally to all types of RMBS trusts created in the
years leading up to the Financial Crisis.
C.

Timing Requirement

To satisfy the timing requirement, an RMBS trust must hold qualified
mortgages on a specific date keyed to the RMBS trust’s formation. Generally, an
obligation is a qualified mortgage only if the RMBS trust is the tax owner of the
obligation on the startup date, or if the trust receives it by contribution or within
three months after the startup date if the RMBS trust purchases it.356 Furthermore,
an RMBS trust comes within the definition of REMIC only if it holds principallysecured obligation within three months after the startup date.357 The description
above of lending and securitization practices reveals that RMBS trusts rarely had
possession of mortgage notes or were mortgagee of record within three months
after the startup date, much less on the startup date.358 The parties also appear to
fail to transfer tax ownership to the RMBS trusts within that time period.359
Finally, until an RMBS trust is mortgagee of record, and has possession of the
mortgage note, it will be unable, in some jurisdictions, to foreclose on the real
property securing the mortgage notes,360 so the loans would not appear to be
principally secured by an interest in real property within the required time period.
Thus, even if an RMBS trust takes some steps to cure defects in the securitization
process after the three-month period expires, such efforts probably would not
355
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result in the RMBS trust owning an obligation that was principally secured by an
interest in real property within the required time period. The failure to own
obligation principally secured by real property within the required time period
will cause many RMBS trusts to fail the timing requirement. The failure would be
equally applicable to a trust with second-lien mortgages.
D.

Substantially-All Requirement

A trust satisfies the substantially-all requirement only if no more than a de
minimis amount of the trust’s assets are prohibited assets (i.e., assets that are not
qualified mortgages or permitted investments).361 A regulatory safe harbor
provides that an RMBS trust satisfies the substantially-all test if the aggregate
basis of the prohibited assets is no greater than 1% of the aggregate basis of all of
the trust’s assets.362 If the aggregate basis of the prohibited assets exceeds the 1%
threshold, the trust may nonetheless be able to demonstrate that it owns no more
than a de minimis amount of prohibited assets.363 The regulations provide no
guidance regarding what a trust must do to demonstrate it owns less than a de
minimis amount of prohibited assets. Nor do they provide a percentage beyond
which the amount of prohibited assets would cease to be de minimis. Nonetheless,
with the 1% safe harbor and the overall tax accounting reasons for granting
special tax treatment to REMICs,364 a de minimis amount of prohibited assets
surely cannot exceed a small percentage of an RMBS trust’s total assets. This
Article illustrates that a significant percentage of the assets of perhaps most
RMBS trusts would not come within the definition of qualified mortgage, so
perhaps most RMBS trusts formed in the years leading up to the Financial Crisis
would have a difficult time meeting the substantially-all requirement. The
hypothetical second-lien RMBS trust would almost certainly fail the substantiallyall requirement test.
A person might argue that if an RMBS trust is not the tax owner of a
mortgage note, the basis of the note reduces both the numerator and the
denominator for purposes of applying the substantially-all requirement. This
theory is unfounded because it does not account for the trust owning some sort of
asset. Even if an RMBS trust’s assets are not qualified mortgages, an RMBS trust
holds some type of asset. If an RMBS trust does not own qualified mortgages, the
nature of the asset it owns will likely depend upon the reason the asset fails to be
a qualified mortgage. The discussion above illustrates that if an RMBS trust does
361
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not hold qualified mortgages, it could hold a loan from the originator or sponsor.
Consequently, for purposes of determining the portion of the trust’s assets that are
prohibited assets, these reclassified assets would be a part of both the numerator
and denominator. If they are much greater than 1% of the trust’s total assets, the
trust should not come within the definition of a REMIC. In many situations, they
would appear to be a significant portion of the trust’s total assets.
An example illustrates the application of the substantially-all requirement.
Suppose an RMBS trust owns $50,000,000 of assets, but because of a failed
securitization, it is the tax owner of only $35,000,000 of mortgage notes. The
$15,000,000 balance of its assets could be an obligation from the originator. The
numerator, for purposes of applying the substantially-all requirement would be
the $15,000,000 of obligation from the originator, and the denominator would
include all $50,000,000 of the trust’s assets. The percent of prohibited assets
would thus be 30% ($15,000,000 divided by $50,000,000). The computation does
not exclude the $15,000,000 that results from the trust’s failure to be the tax
owner of the mortgage notes.
The discussion to this point has reviewed the state of affairs in the RMBS
industry in the years leading up to the Financial Crisis. It also demonstrates that
many RMBS trusts most likely failed to satisfy the REMIC requirements and
provided the legal basis for challenging REMIC classification. Some RMBS trusts
would have an almost impossible chance of convincing a court that they satisfied
the requirements of the REMIC rules. Thus, the Article has presented the legal
reasons for challenging the REMIC classification of numerous RMBS trusts. The
next part of this Article presents the policy reasons for challenging the REMIC
classification of many RMBS trusts.
IV.

POLICY REASONS TO ENFORCE REMIC RULES

At the present, the IRS does not appear to be engaged in auditing REMICs
or enforcing the REMIC rules. Perhaps their reason for not challenging REMIC
status at this time is that they are studying the issues; observing the outcome of
the numerous actions against RMBS trusts, sponsors, and originators; and
gathering better information to choose the appropriate trusts to challenge. If the
IRS fails to act, undoubtedly private parties will eventually instigate qui tam or
whistleblower actions that serve the same policy reasons that should compel IRS
action. Because REMICs did not file the correct returns and may have committed
fraud, the statute of limitations for earlier years should remain open
indefinitely,365 giving the IRS and other parties adequate time to pursue REMIC
365
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litigation after it obtains the information it needs. Ultimately, the IRS should,
however, take action against the parties that made a mockery of the tax system.
The IRS’s failure to do so deprives the government of significant tax revenue,
tacitly sanctions illegal behavior, cedes control of tax enforcement decisionmaking to private industry, disregards Congressional mandate, and relieves the
tax bar of its obligation to help protect the tax system and prudently counsel
RMBS sponsors and trustees.
The private-label RMBS industry is huge. At its peak in 2007 there was
$2.2 trillion dollars in outstanding securities.366 The amount of interest payments
that changes hands on $2.2 trillion of RMBS is astronomical. At just 4%, the
annual interest on the RMBS alone would be $88 billion. The REMIC rules
ensure that RMBS investors and RMBS trustees properly account for that interest
and pay tax on it. RMBS sponsors’ failure to properly create REMICs caused
them to be unable to account for interest inflow and interest outflow. As a
consequence, they most likely failed to report income due to the federal
government, depriving it of billions of dollars of tax revenue.
To illustrate, by overstating the value of mortgage notes, the parties to
RMBS trusts understated the interest rates on the notes. Because of the lack of
sufficient collateral securing a mortgage note and borrowers’ lack of qualification,
mortgage notes were worth much less than their stated value. The stated interest
of the note would therefore be much less than the actual interest. For example, if
the face value of a mortgage note was $100,000 and the stated interest was 5%,
the borrower would pay $5,000 of interest on the note. If, however, the actual
value of the mortgage note was $80,000, the $5,000 payment would represent a
6.25% interest rate. An RMBS trust that reported interest income using the 5%
rate would underreport income. If the interest deductions were otherwise
appropriate, the RMBS trust would therefore understate its taxable income.
Additionally, the inability to maintain a static asset pool with the types of assets
entering RMBS trusts and their poor quality would result in a miscalculation of
phantom income, further depriving the government of tax revenues.367
The IRS’s lack of enforcement activity in this area prior to the Financial
Crisis contributed to the magnitude of the crash.368 If the IRS had been active
auditing RMBS trusts, it would have recognized the inadequacies of the
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securitization process, the poor quality of mortgage notes being securitized, and
the lack of effort to cure defective mortgage notes. Enforcement would have
presented RMBS sponsors not only with the prospect of losing favorable tax
classification for the multiple-tranche RMBS products, but also would have
threatened to expose their misdeeds to otherwise unsuspecting investors.
Exposure of those matters would have spelled the end of the demand for shoddy
RMBS products, and that potential would have placed sufficient market pressure
on RMBS organizers and loan originators to clean up their acts. Thus, the IRS
could have helped deter the Financial Crisis. Its continued failure to enforce
REMIC rules empowers RMBS organizers and loan originators to repeat their
actions using REMIC classification as a front for their illegal actions.
The IRS has been slow to take action to help enforce the REMIC rules and
clean up the RMBS industry. Instead, actions it has taken have benefitted many of
the parties who caused the Financial Crisis. On December 6, 2007, the IRS
released revenue Procedure 2007-72, which said “it would not view loan
modifications specifically made under these guidelines [framework to fend off
foreclosure of subprime mortgages] as grounds to challenge the tax benefits held
by REMICS . . .”369 In October 2009, the IRS provided a degree of flexibility for
CRE loans held in a REMIC. This was later followed by federal bank regulators
encouraging lenders not to foreclose on delinquent CRE borrowers because of the
economic downturn.370 The IRS announced on August 17, 2010 that it will not
challenge the ability of REMICs “to claim certain loans as ‘qualified mortgages’
even if they no longer meet the specific requirements of such loans under tax code
Section 860.”371 These IRS actions are not directed at the heart of the problem and
appear to accommodate the parties who caused the Financial Crisis.
At least one commentator worries that taxing REMICs will unduly harm
investors.372 The sponsors’ failure to adequately structure REMICs, not
enforcement of the laws, has harmed investors. Their failure to structure the
arrangements to obtain favorable tax treatment also harms the investors because
the tax exposure reduces the value of the REMIC interests. Investors should be
able to recover that lost value from the sponsors, so the tax burden, which
represents revenue properly belonging to U.S. taxpayers, should fall upon the
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wrongdoers who organized these shams and misrepresented their quality to
investors. Furthermore, the IRS may be able to impose transferee liability on
sponsors, who transferred mortgage notes worth far less than the consideration
received, and collect any taxes and penalties not covered by the value of RMBS
trusts’ assets.
The IRS’s unwillingness to enforce the REMIC rules cedes control to
private industry, and private industry knows that and abuses its position of power.
As one commentator astutely noted, “They take aggressive positions, and they
figure that if enough of them take an aggressive position, and there’s billions of
dollars at stake, then the IRS is kind of estopped from arguing with them because
so much would blow up. And that is called the Wall Street Rule. That is literally
the nickname for it.”373 Industry experts who appeared to make rules as they went
along now invoke the Wall Street Rule. For example, an author of the leading
REMIC treatise “said that even if the IRS finds wrongdoing, it may be loath to act
because the wide financial damage the penalties would cause.”374 Such patent
recognition of IRS impotence is frightening and threatens to not only undermine
the tax system but also the already tenuous ideal of treating taxpayers equally.
The IRS should not cede control to private parties. If the IRS had performed its
audit function in the years leading up to the Financial Crisis, it could have helped
prevent the problem in the first place and would not have to take action now that
some perceive could potentially cause financial damage.
If the concern is that enforcement action at this time will cause wide
financial damage, this Article should help alleviate that concern. The IRS could
focus on low-hanging fruit: namely, second-lien mortgage RMBS trusts that
claimed to be REMICs. Second-lien mortgage RMBS trusts formed in the years
leading up to the Financial Crisis almost certainly will not satisfy the REMIC
requirements. Thus, proving the case against them will be very possible for the
IRS. Also, second-lien mortgage RMBS issuances were comparatively small, with
about $60 billion in 2005.375 Financial damage to the world economy will not
result from challenging the tax classification of second-lien mortgage RMBS
trusts. The trusts will owe taxes and penalties, and the parties will have to
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determine the ultimate liability for those taxes and penalties. Under a transference
liability theory, that liability could rest with the RMBS sponsors or loan
originators—those parties most responsible for the Financial Crisis. Courts can
work that out.
After pursuing second-lien mortgage RMBS trusts, the IRS could evaluate
the results and decide whether they should make the case with respect to other
types of RMBS trusts and pursue further action against them. IRS enforcement,
even with respect to a portion of the RMBS market, will help the IRS develop
further expertise in this area and enable it to use the expertise to develop better
audit and enforcement practices. The IRS could use those improved skills to help
prevent a catastrophe similar to the one that caused the Financial Crisis.
Enforcement would also reestablish the IRS as the police power in this area, and
take that function back from Wall Street. Enforcement in this area would also
bring other viewpoints and voices to lawmaking in this area.
The IRS’s inaction also damages the tax system in a more general way.
The tax bar has traditionally accepted some responsibility for upholding the
integrity of the tax system. Members of the bar do this by ensuring that advice
they give reflects the highest standards and that they do not participate in
transactions that violate the law. This Article illustrates that a significant
percentage of RMBS trusts probably do not satisfy the REMIC requirements, but
RMBS organizers treated them as REMICs. Some RMBS trusts appear to have
almost no chance of satisfying the requirements. Nonetheless, “will” tax opinion
letters accompanied the RMBS offering materials. A will opinion is the authors’
assurance that the RMBS trust has a 95% chance of prevailing on the merits
should the IRS challenge the classification.376 The authors of the opinions qualify
them by providing that they are reliable only if the securitization occurs as
described in the offering materials.377 Despite that qualifier, the opinion authors
should be accountable for their inaccurate opinions to the extent that they were
aware of the RMBS problems. As industry participants who were close to the
action, they had to know about many of the problems that existed.378 Because of
the Wall Street Rule and IRS inaction, they continued to issue unsupported
opinions. If the IRS does not enforce the REMIC rules, however, members of the
bar arguably will feel no greater obligation to abide by the rules. IRS failure to
enforce the rules gives implicit license to the tax bar to ignore the rules.
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Consequently, the IRS’s inaction causes exponential damage to the tax system as
a whole.
Finally, IRS inaction is an affront to the Congressional action that grants
favorable tax treatment to only certain types of RMBS trusts that satisfy very
specific rules. This offends many commentators, who believe that the IRS should
not exercise such discretion, but should enforce the laws as created by
Congress.379 Furthermore, the detailed rules in the REMIC regime address very
specific purposes,380 and a failure to enforce them undermines those purposes.
Consequently, very significant policy supports the IRS challenging REMIC
classification of at least some RMBS trusts. If the IRS fails to take action, it must
accept responsibility for the financial harm that results from such inaction.
V.

CONCLUSION

The issue of REMIC failure is important in at least four contexts: (1) in
any potential effort by the IRS to clean up this industry and collect tax and
penalties from organizations that did not satisfy the REMIC requirements; (2) in
civil lawsuits brought by REMIC investors against sponsors, underwriters, and
other parties who pooled mortgages and sold mortgage-backed securities; (3) to
state and federal prosecutors who may consider bringing criminal or civil fraud
claims against sponsors, underwriters, and other parties who pooled mortgages
and sold RMBS; and (4) to private parties who know of specific abuse and may
bring qui tam or whistleblower action against purported REMICs. This Article
provides a roadmap for pursuing tax enforcement action against RMBS trusts.
The Article illustrates that many RMBS trusts, perhaps the majority of them,
leading up to the Financial Crisis could not satisfy the REMIC requirements.
Instead of advocating action against all such trusts, however, the Article
recommends that the IRS should consider bringing action against RMBS trusts
that clearly fail to satisfy the REMIC requirements. A logical starting point would
therefore be an examination of RMBS trusts comprised of second-lien mortgage
notes. Findings and results of such actions would help inform the IRS about
whether it should expand the scope of its efforts. Both the law and policy support
such action, so continued inaction is unacceptable.
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